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CHAPTER I 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP 
Alliances between sovereign states have been among 
the least stable of political associations. The relationship 
between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, two totalitarian 
governments, was an uneasy one in the period 1933 to 1945. 
The foreign policies of each, when directed towards expansion 
and world power, found sympathy and support from each other in 
challenging the international order established at Versailles 
in 1919. In Great Britain, Russia and the United States, they 
shared the same opponents, but their antagonism toward these 
enemies involved different objectives which made coordinated 
foreign policies ultimately impossible. Their interests were 
often contradictory, and the two were caught up in grandiose 
delusions about each other's political and military goals. Both 
practiced such secrecy and deception concerning their own 
objectives that even on occasions when their interests 
genuinely converged they were unable to work effectively together. 
The accession of Adolf Hitler to power in Germsjiy 
foreshadowed a new relationship between Germany and Japan. 
Hitler, in his philosophical work, Mein Kampf, expressed the 
idea of expansion or Lebensraum. Leoensraum demanded space to 
the east at the expense of Russia and if necessary through the 
use of force. Thus Hitler looked to Japan as a potential ally 
in a Russo-German conflict. His own analysis of the strategic 
errors in World Y/ar I suggested that the international policy of 
1 
2 
encirclement had been the cause of Germany's defeat. In any 
future war, Hitler meant to encircle Germany's opponents. 
The new governments of the 1930's, through the press, 
radio and the screen, had at their disposal channels of power 
undreamed of and they faced the consequent necessity of making 
their administrations understood in terms of popular appeal. 
Mass inculcation brought in its train mass justification. The 
second half of the nineteenth century had seen the appearance 
of scientific explanations of biological superiority. The 
twentieth century raised it to an "ideal" and called it race. 
Hitler and the Nazi Party, in their fight for power and 
subsequent totalitarian regime, used the "ideal" of racial 
superiority to justify their acts in foreign and domestic 
policies. The German people were told that they were oppressed 
at home and humiliated abroad, yet they, as Germans, constituted 
the embodiment of the superior Nordic racial type. Afflicted 
psychologically with the burden of defeat after the first World 
War, the German citizen found comfort in the explanation that 
his superiority had been unimpaired but that he had been 
betrayed. The argument had appeal, for it touched popular 
sensitivity and the Nazis, above all Hitler, recognized this 
weakness and manipulated it for their rise to power. Hitler 
needed a united state, based on racial superiority, to serve 
1 
as the foundation for German territorial expansion. 
Hitler believed that Japan, like Germany was the victim 
I 
Adolf Hitler, Kein Karnpf (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 
1940), p8J?t I chapter XI passim. 
3 
of a Jewish international conspiracy. The Jew hated Japan in 
whose Asiatic state he could not adapt himself and so subjugate 
it. Hitler stated: 
He (the Jew) dreads a Japanese national State in his 
millennial Jew empire, and therefore wishes its destruction 
in the advance of the founding of his own dictatorship. 
Therefore, he is now inciting the nations against Japan, 
as against Germany, and it can happen that, while British 
statescraft still tries to build an alliance with Japan, 
the British Jewish press already demands struggle against 
the ally and prepares the destructive war under the 
proclamation of democracy and the battlecry: Down with 
Japanese militarism and Imperialism, 2 
Hitler never really liked the Japanese and regarded them with 
distain and contempt. However, a fact which may have had some 
influence in Hitler's future considerations was that Japan, 
like Germany suffered from world Jewry, 
The one-sided argument of racial superiority was a 
domestic issue before the Nazis obtained control of the government, 
but the introduction of such a concept into foreign policy 
would ruin relations with most world powers. In the realm of 
foreign policy, most nations saw themselves obligated to conduct 
their diplomacy after World War I in the name of some "ideal". 
Natural boundaries turned into self-determination, the "white 
man's burden" lost its appeal and arbitration and international 
cooperation became the substance of international relations. 
International isolation would result if the Nazis persisted in 
the ideas of racial superiority, 
ïïazi racial philosophy loomed large as a consideration 
in German foreign policy after 1933, and relations with Japan 
2 
Ibid., peTt II, p. 931. 
presented a special problem. How could a racially superior 
Germany conclude an agreement on equal terms with a supposedly 
inferior nation like Japan? Somehow racial philosophy and the 
practical considerations of foreign policy would have to be 
reconciled in order to undertake any diplomatic negotiations. 
The Nazis modified their racial philosophy in order to 
conciliate their administration with the dictates of foreign 
policy. The success of Japan in Manchuria in 1931 served to 
qualify the strict doctrines of racial superiority in Mein Kampf. 
The military spirit of the Japanese army impressed Hitler, 
A restriction of international racial propaganda occurred after 
1933 for the general purpose of avoiding unnecessary disputes 
in foreign affairs and with the specific intention of 
cultivating better relations with Japan, 
Hitler was enough of a politican not to let ideology get 
in the way of his diplomacy. The racially superior Germany 
allied with the inferior Japan for the sake of expediency. An 
alliance with Japan presented several opportunities for Germany's 
international position. Hitler admired the militant Japanese 
state and could do only one thing: he made the Japanese 
"honorary Aryans" as Party officals gave the Japanese a patent 
of racial enoblement to further diplomatic relations between 
3 
the two countries. Nazi racial philosophy would have to be 
subjugated to the necessities of the German position in 
world affairs. 
3 
Arnold Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 1937), 1936, p. 385. [Hereinafter cited as 
Toynbee, SIA). 
5 
The Nazi-controlled press attempted to mitigate the 
dichotomy in racial thought and to promote closer relations 
between Germany and Japan by reducing racial tension. The Party 
writers proclaimed that the essence of Nazi racial doctrine was 
strictly an internal domestic affair and did not contain a value 
judgement about other racial groups. The Party recognized that 
there existed peoples whose differences did not necessarily 
make them racially inferior and that the Japanese possessed 
racial qualities which made them suitable allies for the racially 
arrogant Germans. Diplomacy expediency resolved the differences 
between Germany and Japan. Nazi hypocrisy arranged that the 
racial question would give no cause for offense to the ally, 
Japan, for Nazi ideals proved no obstacle to Nazi practice. 
The Nazis had one other influential factor whose support 
was considerable for an alliance with Japan: Geopolitics, 
Racial superiority had to be recast to suit the exigencies of 
the Japanese relationship, but Geopolitics on the other hand, 
advocated a pro-Japanese stance. The pseudo-science of Geopolitic 
was a subject which made geography a determining constituent 
of history. As it was used by the Nazis it was nothing more 
than the ideology of imperialist expansion. 
Geopolitics had its orgins in Germany, The country had 
been a leader in geographical research in the nineteenth century 
and Geopolitics evolved from this background in the ea-rly 
part of the twentieth century. The main tenets of Geopolitics, 
the dynamics of a growing state organism and planned imperialism, 
became the political doctrines of Karl Haushofer, a former 
6 
general and later professor of geography at the University of 
4 
Munich, ̂ Haushofer, while in the German army, went on a tour of 
duty to Japan in 1909. He witnessed the annexation of Korea 
in 1910 and the diplomatic preparations surrounding the event. 
When he returned to Germany in 1911 he wrote extensively on the 
community of interests between Japan, Russia and Germany. He 
did not receive much encouragement in Germany, the country 
that had coined the phrase, "the Yellow Peril". 
Haushofer's fundamental calculation was the geographical 
pivot of history with a combination of Germany, Japan and Russia 
to outwit the Western Powers, Great Britain and France. This 
combination would destroy the sea power of the duo through its 
internal lines of communication, Japan was to play a leading 
role in the self-determination of the Asiatic peoples of the 
Far East and this would entail a shift in the balance of power 
in the Pacific. Germany, with her interests in China, could 
5 
hold the balance by allying herself with Japan. 
Haushofer expounded these postulates of his Geopolitics 
in the interwar period to such attentive students as Rudolf 
6 
Hess, the future deputy Party leader of Nazi Germany. Haushofer 
visited Hitler while he was in prison with the help of Hess 
but little is known about his influence on Hitler. However, 
4 
Karl Haushofer, 1869-1946. German geographer, theorist of Nazi 
Geopolitics. He later served as an advisor to Hitler and then 
committed suicide in 1946, 
5 
Andreas Dorpalen, The World of General Haushofer (New York: 
Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940), cHapters I-IV passim. 
6 
Rudolf Eess, 1894-, Nazi follower of Hitler. He flew to 
Scotland in 1941, sentenced at Nuremberg in 1946 and is still 
in prison. 
7 
Hitler's political view of world affairs did contain some of 
the ideas of Geopolitics. 
With careful propaganda and ideas of Geopolitics, the 
Nazis made the race issue compatible for a future entente with 
Japan. Germany needed a friend among the major world powers to 
escape from her encirclement in Europe and Japan was the only 
country which appeared worthy for an alliance of mutual 
"have-not" nations. The ideas of Geopolitics and Germany's 
position made it expedient to forego the Hitlerian ideals of a 
superior race in favor of a practical diplomatic policy to save 
the Third Reich from political isolation. 
Germany had been in the Par East, principally in China, 
since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Bismarckian 
era in Germany had prompted imperialistic expansion into China 
for commercial exploitation which in turn had served notice to 
a new Japanese government of a powerful rival in the Par East, 
The Keiji Restoration reinstituted à strong, central 
government in Japan that looked to the West for its technology. 
The new Japan chose Germany to supply much of its technical 
growth and German military officers to construct a modern 
Japanese army along western lines. It was this German-trained 
army and German-oriented leadership that shocked the Western 
world with its defeat of the Russian armies in the Russo-Japanese 
War in 1904-1905. This close technical and economic cooperation 
continued until the outbreak of the first World War. Germany 
and Japan found themselves on opposite sides in the war and 
Japan took advantage of conditions in Europe to occupy German 
8 
possessions in China and in the Pacific, 
At Versailles, Japan felt slighted by her allies because 
she had to return many of her captured territorial conquests, 
Japan then adopted a policy of peaceful co-existence with her 
neighbors in the Pacific, but the economic crisis of the world 
depression intensified the frustration of the peace settlements 
and encouraged political radicalism. A militant young officer 
corps of the Japanese army developed a boundless nationalism 
constructed on a philosophy of territorial expansion through the 
use of military force. The nationalists in Japan immediately 
recognized that the depression reduced foreign markets and 
imported raw materials, threatening the very foundation of the 
Japanese state. The Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931 
v/as an expression of the omnipresent pressure of the military 
complex and the depression. The conquest of Manchuria signalled 
the beginning of the military domination and eventual control 
of the government in Japan, 
The incident in Manchuria meant a new foreign policy 
for Japan because the act isolated Japan from the world 
community. The other world powers looked upon the act as 
contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations and against 
previous declarations outlawing such actions. Japan withdrew 
from the league of Nations in March, 1933 to protest the 
non-recognition of the newly created puppet state of lûanchukuo. 
The United States and Great Britain assumed a new interest in 
the Pacific in light of the hostile actions of Japan against 
China. Japan, threatened by the naval powers in the Pacific and 
9 
the colossus Russia in the north, cast around for a friendly 
power in -a similar situation. The Nazi state in Germany appeared 
to have a bond with Japan through common grievances and 
common isolation, 
Germany had had strictly formal relations with Japan 
through the 1920's but with Hitler in power in 1933, the situation 
changed rapidly, Germany had withdrawn from the League of 
Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933 and had signed 
a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934. These diplomatic 
events had aroused the British and the French and a hostile 
Russia. This opposition and the change in Nazi racial propaganda 
had helped to construct a new friendship with Japan. The 
international status of both countries after events in 1933 had 
made both totalitarian states anti-League, anti-communist and 
anti-revolutionary, but in an active aggressive way favoring 
territorial expansion. 
Germany renewed her diplomatic contacts with Japan 
because increased tension in Europe necessitated a strong 
diplomatic maneuver by Hitler against one of his potential 
enemies, Russia, Hitler wanted to encircle Russia and an entente 
with Japan v/as one step towards this goal. Hitler's fear of 
Russia and his tirades against Bolshevism were to provide the 
impetus to diplomatic negotiations that was to begin the 
tenuous alliance between Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT 1933-1936 
Germany's position in 1935 stimulated the need for an 
ally to share the burden of world hostility. Great Britain and 
Prance did not approve of Germany's decision to rearm and open 
rumors circulated in European capitals of possible punitive 
actions and a preventive v/ar against the Nazi regime. Hitler 
signed a ten year non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934 with 
a stipulation to respect existing territorial rights. The 
ag3?eeïnent created a serious breach in the French eastern 
European alliance system but France countered with a treaty of 
mutual assistance with Russia in 1935. Germany's new militant 
position aroused Soviet fears and suspicions. Russia in turn 
signed a treaty for mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia in 
the same year. The imminent threat of encirclement alarmed 
Hitler and prompted serious consideration of an alliance with 
Japan. The fear of Bolshevism and the new Soviet menace in 
western Europe was the immediate basis for the decision. 
Most Prussian statesmen of the nineteenth century acted 
on the assumption that Russian neutrality was the key to 
Germany's security. Hitler's change of attitude had several 
motives. The leader of Germany, who had risen to power on the 
claim that he had crushed Communism at home, had to be consistent 
in his policy toward Russia. But after his domestic victory, 
it was necessary to convince the German public that a larger 
Communist menace still cast its shadow upon Germany from the 
10 
11 
vast spaces beyond her eastern frontiers. The Fuehrer's 
emotional attitude, an attitude in which fear was compounded 
with hatred, and hatred with hysteria, served to champion 
National Socialism as the saviour of the western world, commending 
itself to the critics of the regime. The hatred of Russia 
helped to perpetuate the ideas in Mein Kampf of Lebensraum 
in the east and the need for territorial expansion to meet the 
needs of the German people. The Bolshevik threat could be 
construed to make German rearmament acceptable in western Europe 
with the Hitlerian assurance that the new German national 
policy would be used to defend Europe against the Russian "Red 
Peril". The clash of the rival political systems was an 
important feature of international relations in Europe and the 
antagonism of Communism an equally important factor in the 
foreign policy of Japan in the Far East. 
The Japanese government, in the midst of a virulent 
nationalism and influenced by the military, considered Russia 
an anathema to its mission in the Far East. Japan saw herself 
as the divinely appointed promulgator of a particular type of 
political and cultural ideals. These ideals clashed with the 
formitable Communist doctrines of Russia. In Japan's attempt 
to bring under her influence various Chinese and Mongolian 
peoples, Russia imposed restrictions upon Japanese expansionist 
aims in the Far East that were intolerable to the Japanese 
militarists and nationalists. 
Japan successfully had suppressed Communism as a 
domestic threat, but the military leaders had come to regard 
12 
the spread of Communisra on the east Asiatic mainland as Japan's 
principal external danger; and this danger was the motive 
underlying a large part of the Japanese action in Manchuria 
and in North China, 
Hitler dealt cautiously with the proposed Japanese 
entente. There were many groups in the country who were not 
favorably disposed toward Hitler's pro-Japanese policies, among 
them the German army. The Reichswehr (German army) had been 
providing China with military advisors since 1928 and the military 
prestige, coupled with a profitable outlet for Germany's armament 
industries made the Reichswehr Sinophile in its Par Eastern 
disposition. It was a favorite subject for German military 
authors to point to Japan's economic weaknesses in the conduct 
of modern war because her war potential was entirely dependent 
on raw materials from abroad. This pro-Chinese position also 
manifested itself in the Wilhelmstrasse (the German Foreign Office) 
The German Foreign Office displayed little support for 
Hitler and regarded him as an upstart in matters of foreign 
policy, traditionally handled by the career diplomats of 
Germany's foreign service. Hitler's first Foreign Minister, 
1 
Freiherr von îTeurath, was indubitably a man of the old school 
and a career diplomat. Hitler's judgement of him was good; 
"Ueurath is unimaginative. Shrewd as a peasant, but with no ideas. 
1 
Constantine von Neurath, 1873-1956, German statesman. After a 
long diplomatic career, he was Hitler's Foreign Minister, 1933-
1938 and later protector of Bohemia, He was tried at Nuremberg, 
sentenced to prison and released in 1954. 
2 
Herman Raushnig, The Voice of Destruction (New York: G.P, 
Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 275. 
13 
As a product of the Y/llhelmstrasse, von Neurath was pro-Chinese. 
When confronted with unpleasant realities, von Neurath preferred 
to evade the issue rather than to offer his personal opposition. 
This was what Hitler wanted as he stated: "...At the moment 
it's his benevolent appearance that is of most use to me. You 
can't imagine a man like that going in for a revolutionary policy 
3 
they will say in England," Hitler realized that the career 
diplomats furnished a measure of respectability for the Nazi 
regime in international relations. But it was too early to 
replace these diplomats with Hitler's own men to commence his 
personal diplomatic schemes. Hitler faced a real problem in 
finding an adequate substitute for the German Foreign Office 
inasmuch as the Party's o\m members lacked diplomatic training. 
Most Party members had not been abroad and lacked any facility 
in foreign languages. To fill this gap in his entourage, Hitler 
4 
turned to a trusted friend, Joachim von Ribbentrop, 
Ribbentrop had served in the German army during the 
first World War and then as a member of the German delegation to 
Versailles. He had formed his own wine company after the war, 
married the daughter of another wine merchant, and quickly 
had become one of the leading dealers in Europe. With his 
champagne conviviality, charm and linquistic facilities, 
Ribbentrop had become a welcome figure in the salons of the 
3 
Ibid., p. 275. 
4 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1833-1946. Nazi Foreign Minister. He 
served as ambassador to Great Britain, 1936-1938 before becoming 
Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1945. He was tried at Nuremberg, 
and hanged in 1946. 
major European embassies. Prom these glimpses of diplomatic 
life, he-had acquired a taste for the responsibilities and the 
power of world diplomacy. 
Ribbentrop met Hitler in August, 1952, when Ribbentrop, 
favorably disposed to the Nazi movement, received Hitler at his 
home in Dahlem as a frequent guest. The Party's leadership, 
Goering, Hess, Goebbels and Rosenberg, considered Ribbentrop 
to be an interloper. For a while, Ribbentrop served as an 
instructor to the Party on foreign affairs and as an advisor to 
Hitler, who made use of his linguistic abilities. In April, 1934, 
Hitler appointed Ribbentrop Reich delegate on matters of 
.disarmament, Ribbentrop used his position to see the daily 
dispatches from abroad and reports sent to Hitler, He 
synthesized Hitler's opinions on various matters and made them 
his own. The similarity between Ribbentrop's views and his 
own, impressed Hitler, who welcomed this contrast to the 
conservative advice of the Wilhelmstrasse, 
Hitler, astute enough to realize that he could not allow 
a novice to take over the execution of foreign affairs, instead 
allowed Ribbentrop to form his own organization for foreign 
affairs, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, in late 1934, This para-
foreign service, financed from Hitler's private budget, served 
several useful purposes. The Dienststelle Ribbentrop handled 
many confidential tasks and substituted for the distrusted 
Foreign Office, which now conducted only routine matters in 
foreign affairs, Ribbentrop assembled a collection of newspaper 
people, linquists, professors and businessmen to staff his 
15 
organization. He preformed his early missions with singular 
dispatch and vigor, and his genial appearance, affability and 
informality were in sharp contrast to the Wilhelmstrasse 
diplomats, Ribbentrop's agents kept German embassies and 
legations under constant surveillance and provided Hitler with 
two agencies to manipulate his foreign policy. 
As chance would have it, both Germany and Japan had 
exchanged new military attaches in early 1934 which proved to 
be of great significance in the diplomatic relations between the 
5 
two countries. Colonel Eugen Ott had served for about ten 
years in the political department of the German Foreign Office. 
He had served for a short period of time in 1933 as an offical 
observer for the German army in Japan and then had returned to 
Germany. Ott received the appointment of military attache' to 
Tokyo and had departed from Berlin with no specific instructions 
for his new task from his superiors but with the knowledge of 
Hitler's intense interest in the Par East. 
6 
The Japanese appointment of Colonel Hiroshi Oshima as 
military attache to Germany had a more deliberate purpose, 
Oshima had served as an assistant attache in Germany and Austria 
from 1921 to 1923 and was outspokenly pro-German and a 
representative of the Japanese army. The Japanese military 
attaches reported directly to General Headquarters in Tokyo 
5 
Eugen Ott, German army officer. He served as military attache 
to Japan until 1939 and then became ambassador until the end 
of the war. 
6 
Hiroshi Oshima, 1693-1948. Japanese officer. He was the 
Japanese ambassador to Germany in 1941. later he was tried for 
war crimes and hanged in 1943. 
16 
with the authority to enter into independent negotiations on 
any military agreement, Oshima had received instructions to 
investigate the stability of the Nazi regime, the future of the 
7 
German army and the state of relations "between Germany and Russia. 
These military appointments, surrounded by events 
which seemed most auspicious, furthered the German-Japanese 
entente. Both countries displayed an interest in the 
possibilities of an alliance in 1935. Hitler regarded the 
Japanese as an influential factor in the Russian situation and 
considered a war between Russia and Japan over China as a 
possible opportunity for German intervention in European Russia* 
The early diplomatic exchanges between the two countries 
8 
were cautious. The German ambassador, Herbert von Dirksen, 
suggested to the Foreign Office in early 1934 that Germany 
recognize the new state of Manchukuo in order to eniiance 
Germany's relations with Japan and to lessen Japanese resentment 
9 
on the racial issue. The presence of German military' advisors 
in China irritated the Japanese, who resented this assistance 
10 ' -
to Chiang Kai-shek. The German government hesitated and advised 
7 
International Military Tribunal fo the Far East (Tokyo: War 
Ministry Library, 1943)7 P* 3508. (Hereinafter cited as IMT'FE) . 
8 
Herbert von Dirksen, 1882-. German diplomat. He had a long-
career in the German Foreign Office and served as German 
ambassador to Jaoan from 1936 to 1938. 
9 
Documents on German Foreign Policy (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 19597, Series C vol. II, Dirksen to GFM 17 
October 1934 No. 7 p. 9. (Hereinafter cited as DGFP). 
10 
Ibid., Series C vol. Ill, Dirksen to Buelow 4 January 1934 No. 162 
pp. 298-300. 
17 
von Dirksen to avoid: "...any close relations with Japan 
which might lay us (Germany) open to being suspected of wishing 
11 
to render assistance against Russia." 
Hitler queried Ribbentrop about more intimate connections 
with Japan in late 1934 but Ribbentrop was to busy consolidating 
his own position to consider the assignment. Ribbentrop 
negotiated the Anglo-German naval agreement in 1935 and acquired 
sufficient influence and prestige to undertake the immediate 
need for an agreement with Japan. 
The Japanese viewed German efforts in the Far East 
with apprehension because of the former German colonies held 
by Japan and Germany's offical Sinophile position. The Japanese 
military leaders were not at all certain about Germany's 
relations with Russia and presumed that Germany, because of 
her close geographical proximity to Russia, feared the Communist 
state. This common fear of Communism became the immediate 
pretext for the diplomatic negotiations preceding the signature 
of the first German-Japanese alliance. 
Russia was not idle with two conflicting ideologies on 
her borders in the 1930's. In August, 1935, the seventh 
World Congress of the Communist International met in Koscow 
to plan world Communist strategy. The Congress decided to work 
in cooperation with Social Democrats of the Popular îTont 
movements in Spain and in Prance. But the Communists went 
even further, adopting a resolution condemning fascist aggressors 
and imperialist warmongers, stating: 
ÏÏ 
Ibid., Series C vol. Ill, Buelow to Trautmann 12 October 1934 
No. 247 p. 480. 
18 
In the face of the war provocations of the German fascists 
and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments 
by the war parties in the capitalist countries...the 
central slogan of the Communist Parties must "be: struggle 
for peace. All those interested in the preservation of 
peace should be drawn into this vital front. The 
concentration of forces against the chief instigators of 
war at any given moment (at the present time-against fascist 
Germany and against Poland and Japan which are in league 
with it) constitutes a most important task of the 
Communist Parties. 12 
The Communist International declared war on Germany and Japan, 
This new Russian foreign policy statement was a splendid 
argument for German-Japanese collaboration. The overt threat 
presented a convenient opportunity to crystallize an auspicious 
partnership between Germany and Japan to counter the 
Comintern (Communist International), 
Ribbentrop conversed with the Japanese military attache 
Oshima to determine the views of the Japanese army toward a 
13 
proposed defensive alliance against Russia in June, 1935, 
Oshima gave no definite reply and wired the General Staff in 
14 
Tokyo for instructions. The Comintern resolution in August 
prompted Ribbentrop to intensify German efforts. Ribbentrop 
wanted to know the opinion of the Japanese army about an 
agreement with Germany stipulating that neither Germany nor 
Japan would aid Russia if war began between either party 
15 
and Russia. 
12 
Report of the Seventh World Congress of the Communist Internationa 
(London: Modern Books Ltd., 193o), p. 24. 
13 
IKTPE, exhibits 477, p. 3508. 
14 
Ibid., record pp. 3481-3491. 
15 
Ibid.. exhibits 477, pp. 2762, 3492, 
19 
The Japanese General Staff replied to Oshima's inquiry 
stating that the proposal required further examination. The 
General Staff sent Lieutenant Colonel Wakamatsu of the German 
division of General Headquarters to Berlin to ascertain the 
views of the German army and the German government concerning 
the possibility of concluding an agreement against the Comintern. 
Until Wakamatsu's arrival in Berlin in November, 1935 neither 
side took any further action. 
16 
Ribbentrop and General von Blomberg, the Reich Minister 
of War, met in Berlin with Wakamatsu in secret conference. 
Wakamatsu stated that the Japanese army v/as in favor of a 
general treaty, Ribbentrop in turn suggested that Germany and 
Japan conclude a separate anti-Comintern agreement. Inasmuch 
as the seventh Congress of the Communist International declared 
both nations to be its enemies, Ribbentrop proposed that Germany 
and Japan had a similar need to defend themselves. Wakamatsu 
replied that the Japanese army felt the same way but since 
these proposals were Ribbentrop*s and not from the Foreign 
Office, he wished to know where the German government stood on 
the matter, Wakamatsu assumed that the German government 
preferred a pact against the Comintern rather than a direct 
military alliance. There was no further progress in subsequent 
talks, and Wakamatsu left Berlin to inform the Japanese army. 
The disjunction of Hitler's two foreign policy 
organizations made itself blatantly apparent when von Dirksen, 
IE 
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the German ambassador, learned of the negotiations in Berlin, 
not from his own Foreign Office (v/hich knew nothing of the talks) 
17 
but from the Japanese General Staff. Von Dirksen endeavored to 
inform the German Foreign Office in a memorandum when he stated: 
...Japan is the only Great Power which is opposed to the 
Soviet Union both on profound ideological grounds and for 
a great variety of political reasons, and which, in addition, 
appears to be determined to settle these differences by 
force of arms as soon as she feels militarily strong enough. 18 
Ribbentrop conducted his diplomatic negotiations in such an 
oblique manner that Hitler or the Japanese could repudiate 
these unoffical contacts, but such methods were to attain the 
sought-after alliance. 
The year 1936 witnessed a series of crises on the 
international scene that sharpened the ideological battle 
against Russia and the activities of the Comintern. In Prance, 
the Blum Cabinet, supported by the Popular Pront took office 
in June. The Civil Yfar in Spain began in July with fascist 
and Communist elements on opposite sides. The Spanish Civil War 
furnished the Nazis with a potent argument, maintaining that 
the war truly represented the outcome of the decisions at the 
Comintern Congress. Germany claimed to be the defender of 
western civilization against the insidious influence of the 
Comintern. The conclusive anti-Communist position of the 
German government encouraged support in Japanese political 
17 
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circles for an alliance. To the Japanese, Nazi foreign policy 
appeared to justify a closer relationship with Germany to 
counter the activities of the Comintern, 
Hitler met the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Viscount 
19 
Kushakoji, in June, 1936 when the ambassador returned from 
Japan with instructions on the suggested alliance with Germany. 
Mushakoji stated that Japan regarded Communism as a serious 
menace and that: "she looked with great respect on Germany, 
who, as Russia's western neighbor, had overcome this danger. 
Japan, as a spiritually related country...desired the closest 
20 
cooperation with Germany." Ribbentrop presented the German 
proposals for a limited agreement with the Japanese, and 
21 
Mushakoji forwarded the terms to Tokyo, 
Ambassador von Dirksen returned to Berlin in 1936 and 
discussed the Japanese situation with Ribbentrop. The German 
Foreign Ministry knew nothing of the nev/ activities of the 
Dienststelle Ribbentrop and von Dirksen had to inform them of 
the diplomatic exchanges. Foreign Minister von Keurath was 
very suspicious and opposed any political agreement with Japan. 
The Wilhelmstrasse made no effort to interfere and allowed 
Ribbentrop to continue the negotiations. The ambassador 
returned to Tokyo with the impression that Hitler attached 
22 
great importance to the negotiations with Japan. Colonel Ott, 
19 
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the military attache, also returned home to attend the fall 
maneuvers of the German army. Hitler asked Ott for his opinion 
on the situation in Japan, Ott replied that the Japanese army 
favored the conclusion of a German-Japanese agreement. 
Negotiations for the pact began in earnest with this 
information and after the Japanese discussed the proposals of 
June, 1936. Ribbentrop reported to Hitler on the negotiations 
from the first of August with the Japanese military attache 
Oshima. The two parties worked on the various details to 
satisfy the Japanese government and were in agreement on the 
23 
major articles of the pact by mid-August, 
The greatest difficulties lay in the provisions of the 
secret accords to the pact. Ribbentrop attempted to write a 
broad stipulation into the first secret article which dealt 
with the actions of either party if one became involved in a 
conflict with Russia, The Japanese regarded this provision as a 
negative point which put little restraint on either participant. 
The Germans compromised on the point but insisted that the 
clause plainly designating Russia remain in the article. The 
two parties settled other difficulties on future agreements 
with Russia with an exchange of supplementary notes to the 
pact. The Japanese opposed publication of the Anti-Comintern 
Pact but Ribbentrop insisted that it be done and the Japanese 
army pressured the Japanese Foreign Office to accept. There 
was some hesitancy in Japanese political circles that Germany 
_ 
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stood to gain immensely and would exploit her position, using 
Japan as a tool for her own foreign policy. The army again 
overcame the opposition and the two parties, Rib'oentrop and 
Kushakoji, initialled the completed draft on 23 October in 
Berlin, in front of Hitler. 
The treaty's preamble, written with the intent to 
broaden the popular appeal and acceptance of the document, 
stated the opposition of the two signatories, Germany and Japan, 
to the objectives of the Comintern. In tho following articles 
they agreed to consult each other on Communist activities, 
inviting third parties to join the pact. The pact was to 
remain in force for five years with a provision for renewal. 
The supplementary protocol dealt v/ith the exchange of information 
about the activities of the Comintern and the formation of a 
permanent committee to handle the coodination of measures 
24 
against Communist subversion. 
The heart of the pact was in the text of the secret 
protocol attached to the public agreement, Germany and Japan 
recognized the threat of Russia and provided in Article one that : 
Should one of the High Contracting States become the 
object of an unprovoked attack or threat of an attack 
by the USSR, the other High Contracting State obligates 
itself to take no measures which tend to ease the situation 
of the USSR... 25 
The other secret articles of the protocol dealt with future 
treaties between the signatories and Russia with the secret 
24 
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agreement being part of the public agreement against 
26 
the Comintern. 
Ribbentrop and Mushakoji exchanged notes to clarify 
certain provisions of the secret protocol, Mushakoji's notes, 
Annexes One and Two, stated that both governments agreed that: 
the 'political treaties' referred to in Article II of the 
aforementioned Supplementary Agreement do not include either 
fishery treaties, or treaties concerning concessions, or 
treaties concerning frontier questions between Japan, 
Manchukuo, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 27 
In his reply, Ribbentrop confirmed this interpretation. 
Ribbentrop's note. Annexes Three and Four of the 
secret protocol, stated that; 
The German government does not regard the provisions of the 
existing political treaties between Germany and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, such as the Rapallo Treaty 
of 1922 and the Treaty of Neutrality of 1926, in so far 
as they have not become null and void under the conditions 
existing at the time the Agreement comes into force, as 
being in contradiction to the spirit of the Agreement and 
the obligations arising from it, 28 
In his reply, Kushakoji stated that his government took note 
with sincere satisfaction of this communication. Both parties 
agreed to keep the Annexes secret and reveal them, by mutual 
consent, to third parties. 
The agreement required the final approval of the 
Japanese Privy Council, Those Japanese in favor stressed the 
danger of Russia in the Par East and the growing unrest in the 
26 
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area. In Japan's view, Germany faced a similar situation in 
Europe and it was only natural that the two countries should 
cooperate. Russia, having secured her position in Europe with 
alliances between herself, Prance and Czechoslovakia, appeared 
ready to devote more time to the Par East, increasing the 
threat of Russian intervention. Those Japanese opposed to 
the treaty feared widespread repercussions at home and increased 
hostility with Russia. The objections found little support 
Eind the Privy Council unanimously approved the Anti—Comintern 
Pact on 25 November 1936. 
In Berlin, Hitler quickly approved the pact and in 
order to justify the agreement, initiated a torrent of anti-
Communist propaganda, Nazi vituperation reached new heights 
under the slogan of "the Battle against Bolshevism", The 
German press denounced Russian foreign policy and concluded 
that a defensive alliance against Bolshevism was highly 
desirable, Ribbentrop signed the agreement for Germany as 
Minister Plenipotentiary at large. The agreement, signed in 
the offices of the Dienststelle, rather than the German Foreign 
Office and without the signature of Germany's Foreign Minister, 
caused a great deal of speculation at the time, Ribbentrop 
explained after the war that the Fuehrer arranged it in that 
manner because he wished to denote the pact *s ideological 
28 
nature and to avoid an offical air. Hitler was not eager to 
have von Neurath sign the pact because in case it became 
28 
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expedient to repudiate the entire project, the fact that the 
German Foreign Minister had not approved the agreement would 
be of some help. 
The major European countries received the news of the 
pact with open misgivings and were already wondering if they 
might be victims of aggressive designs by either Germany or 
Japan. They assumed that these designs might be brought nearer 
to realization now that the two powers suspected of harboring 
such designs were openly allied in common cause. Russia, not 
satisfied v/ith the various explanations given to her by the 
German ambassador, scorned the agreement. The Russian Foreign 
29 
Minister, Maxim Litvinov, speaking on 26 November before the 
All-Union Congress, gave vent to Russian exasperation when 
he stated: 
Well-informed people refuse to believe that for the drawing 
of the two scanty published articles of the German-Japanese 
agreement it was necessary to conduct negotiations for 
fifteen months, and that on the Japanese side it v/as 
necessary to entrust these negotiations to an Army general, 
and on the German side to an important diplomat, and that 
it was necessary to conduct these negotiations in an 
atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. As regards the 
published...agreement, it is only a camouflage for another 
agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initially 
...(and) in which the word 'Communism' is not even mentioned.30 
The Russians were well-informed about the real intention of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact. The agreement could only serve to 
worsen relations between Germany and Russia. 
29 
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The British took a dim view of the pact, and its 
publication aroused immediate apprehensions for the security 
of the Empire. It appeared that the Germans and the Japanese 
intended to divide the world on ideological grounds with the 
British Empire challenged on all shores. Italy maintained a 
careful reserve and pointedly avoided any indication that she 
planned to adhere to the pact in the near future. But Ribbentrop 
spoiled the secrecy when, speaking of; "Germany...creating 
a bulwark against this pestilence (Bolshevism) in Central 
Europe," he predicted that soon: "Italy will hoist the anti-
31 
Bolshevist banner in the south." Hitler believed that Italy, 
bound by the October Protocols of 1936 with Germany, would 
join the Anti-Comintern Pact to create a triple entente. 
The German government disclosed that the pact was open 
to all other nations as an assurance against the Comintern 
threat. The German press contended that the Japanese were 
united in support of the pact—thus ignoring the widespread 
opposition in Japan to the agreement, A publicity campaign 
began to promote popular interest in Japanese culture to abet 
the political coalition between the two countries. 
In Tokyo, the pact received a decidedly unenthusiastic 
reception. The Japanese press, a bit less restricted than its 
German counterpart, regarded the agreement as a sudden decision 
in foreign policy to decide Japan's friends and enemies. The 
Tokyo Asahi on 2 December vrcote: 
— 
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In plain language it is too hasty, we should think, for 
Japan to decide her foreign policy without first examining 
whether England is Japan's friend or enemy. As Chiang 
Kai-Shek, of all people, has said...the agreement in 
question can by no means help Japan in pursuit of her 
policy toward Russia. Why? Because it is impossible to 
think that Germany would lend her forces to Japan in 
event of any crisis between Japan and Russia. 32 
It appeared that the Japanese made lukewarm friends at the 
expense of red-hot enemies. Many Japanese resented being 
dragged into European conflicts at the expense of Japan's 
independence in foreign affairs. 
An analysis of the Anti-Comintern Pact and its 
significance must consider Hitler's foreign policy in Europe and 
in the Par East. The pact against the Comintern threatened 
Russia in both Europe and in Asia. The pact menaced Great 
Britain and Prance in these same areas. Because there were no 
commitments in the agreement for military action, the pact 
was ineffectual in case of war. However, the assumed stipulations 
of military obligations extended Germany's influence to 
world-wide dimensions. But the provisions of the pact obligated 
Germany to accept a policy that was contrary to her previous 
diplomatic position. 
The German government could not influence Japan's foreign 
policy despite Ribbentrop's efforts. The provisions of the 
Anti-Comintern Pact did not include any dangerous obligations, 
but Hitler failed to foresee the consequences of Japan's 
32 
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foreign policy in the Far East, The German government wanted 
.to establish closer relations with Japan and at the sarae time, 
maintain Germany's influential position in China, This policy 
demanded diplomacy far beyond the extent of Ribbentrop'g 
ability» When Japan became involved in a war with China in 
1937, Germany had little recourse but to acquiesce to Japanese 
requests and to end her aid to China. The ultimate significance 
of the Anti-Comintern Pact was the dependence of German foreign 
policy in the Far East on Japan's disposition. 
Japan wanted an agreement with Germany to immobilize 
Russia in the Far East by threatening her on two borders. The 
Japanese government did not want à definite agreement against 
Russia which included military obligations but sought instead 
to forestall Russia with the threat of Germany in the west. 
Japan did obtain this in the Anti-Comintern Pact and could 
proceed with her territorial aggrandizement in China. The 
German government underestimated the character of its ally, 
Japan, and this blunder was full of portent when Germany's 
real opponent in Europe became not Russia but Great Britain. 
CHAPTER III 
THE FIRST CRISIS 1937-1938 
Germany's position in world affairs seemed rather 
auspicious at the beginning of 1937» The new German government 
had reclaimed the Rhineland, and rearmament had reestablished 
Germany as the strongest power in central Europe. The Anti-
Comintern Pact with Japan and the October Protocols with Italy 
had given Hitler a measure of security and an instrument to 
use against the vacillating diplomats of Europe. Germany's 
stature had risen in Europe and in the Par East. Relations 
with Japan had grown on the new political foundation, trade with 
Manchuria had been revived and the profitable commerce with 
China offered a firm base for a friendly but informal relationship. 
Germany did not want to neglect her friendship with 
China despite the coalition with Japan, Hitler realized that, 
after the Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany needed to maintain a 
balance between China and Japan so as not jeopardise the Chinese 
trade. Hitler, receiving the first Chinese ambassador in 
1936, stated; "Germany is anxious carefully to foster and 
deepen the friendly relations which have so long existed 
between our two countries." This policy was put to the supreme 
test when v/ar began between China and Japan in July, 1937. 
Germany found that she could not maintain this foreign policy 
I 
Norman Baynes, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1922-1939 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1942), vol. II p. 1271. ("Hereinafter 
cited as Baynes, Speeches). 
30 
31 
in the Par Bast in opposition to Japan, and Germany would 
have to foresake China to save the entente with Japan, 
Japan entered the war against China with her own 
slogan, "the Battle against Bolshevism in Asia" but Germany 
professed serious doubts about the Communist menace. The new 
Par Eastern v/ar created a visible strain in the diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. The German Foreign Office 
sent indentical telegrams to all its missions, stating that: 
"Germany will observe strict neutrality in the Par Eastern 
2 
conflict." Por the sake of German commercial interests in 
China and her Anti-Comintern policy, Germany desired a peaceful 
solution to the v/ar. But Germany took no steps to join any 
aotdion to stop Japan or to help negotiate a peace settlement, 
a move which would have definitely been in Germany's favor to 
extricate herself from her awkward position. The Japanese 
ambassador, Viscount Mushakoji, explained the Japanese military 
campaign in China to the German Foreign Office as service to 
Germany because of its anti-Communist intent. Baron von 
3 
V/eizsaecker, head of the Political Department, contradicted 
the ambassador by pointing out to him that the policy did not 
lead to an elimination of Communism in China but would actually 
foster the ideology. The Anti-Comintern Pact had never been 
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intended to fight Communism in other countries and the war 
4 
brought Germany no benefits. Two issues, German trade with 
China and German military advisors in China, were to renew the 
old hostilities between Germany and Japan and place the new 
alliance at its most tenuous extreme until Germany sacrificed 
her position in the Par East for the bond with Japan. 
The issue of German trade with China, much of it in 
military equipment, stretched Germany's "strict neutrality" 
and sharply delineated the division between the German Foreign 
Office and those in the Nazi Party concerned with foreign policy, 
Germany was brought face to face with a dilemma that had been 
iniierent in the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact. The longtime Sinophile 
attitude of the German Foreign Office and the fear of possible 
commercial ruin in business circles enhanced the anti-Japanese 
feeling in Germany. China placed large commercial orders 
in Germany for armaments and industrial machinery, Germany in 
turn acquired much needed foreign exchange from these transactions 
and also valuable strategic raw materials, including tin and 
wolfram. The German Foreign Office felt that China was a much 
better ally than Japan and German businessmen saw in China a 
lucrative market with vast economic potential. The German 
Officer Corps supported these pro-Chinese views with its own 
unfavorable opinion of the Japanese army. Many officers 
believed that Japan could never occupy the whole of China. 
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China would remain unconquered and this would result in a 
long, protracted war which Japan could not sustain economically 
without bringing chaos to the internal structure of the 
Japanese economy and nation. 
The Japanese acted quickly to demand what was expected 
of Germany in their political relationship. The Japanese 
Counselor speaking to Weizsaecker, insisted that all German arms 
deliveries to China be halted, including those already contracted 
5 
by China to Germany. The German Foreign Office attempted to 
justify German actions, stating that the export of arms to 
China was on a modest scale and regardless of the Anti-Comintern 
6 
Pact, could, not be made an issue for German-Japanese negotiations. 
The German government, in view of its proclamation of 
neutrality, agreed to make no new deliveries of arms, but was 
nevertheless understandably loath to cancel existing orders. 
Hitler ordered that no further Chinese orders be accepted and 
that arms shipments to China be camouflaged as much as possible 
7 
to avoid antagonizing the Japanese, Hitler's disposition 
toward Japan endeavored to protect the advantageous Chinese 
commerce, an important contribution to the German economy. The 
Japanese, not satisfied by this double talk, threatened to seize 
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German arms shipments en route to China if Germany did not 
8 
comply to Japan's demands. 
German military advisors in China, ex-officers of the 
German army and hired by the Chinese government to create a 
modem Chinese army, had absolutely no connection with the 
German government on any offical basis. Commanded by General 
9 
Alexander von Palkenhausen, they did much to promote German-
Chinese relations and to increase German influence and prestige 
in the Chinese government. Members of the German Foreign Office 
realized that if Japan insisted upon the recall of these advisors, 
China might then turn to Russia to provide officers to instruct 
Chinese troops. This was the very last thing that Hitler 
wanted. The possibilities of Russian interference grew with the 
signature of the Russo-Chinese Non-Aggression Pact on 21 August 
1937. The Japanese government demanded late in August that the 
German personnel be ordered to leave the country because they 
were participating in staff planning and the tactical 
disposition and control of Chinese troops fighting the Japanese 
invaders. This military assistance stiffened Chinese resistance. 
Berlin warned Palkenhausen not to collaborate but to little 
10 
avail. Within a brief time from the beginning of the war in 
July, Germany faced decisions affecting her entire position 
in the Par East. Germany had to choose between complying v/ith 
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Japanese requests or see the efforts of the last four years 
to esta'bl.ish an accord with Japan wasted, 
German foreign policy at this critical point lacked 
unity and direction. The German Foreign Office viewed Japanese 
actions in China with alarm and disapproved of the conflict. 
The Foreign Office did not want to yield to Japanese demands 
against the arms shipments and military advisors, "but although 
cognizant of the implications of this stand, lacked the influence 
to save the German position in China from destruction. Hitler 
pursued a vacillating policy, unable to choose between Germany's 
previous interests or the new political alliance with Japan, 
In a discussion with von Neurath on 16 August, Hitler stated 
that: "he adhered in principle, to the idea of cooperating 
with Japan, but that, in the present conflict between China and 
11 
Japan, Germany must remain neutral," Hitler's decision on 
arms shipments to China conflicted with his previous 
pronouncements toward Japan, 
The Nazi Party's foreign policy advisors did not foresee 
the fatal course of Japan's imperialist policy against China. 
Eibbentrop, not concerned with Germany's interest in China, 
advocated a strong pro-Japanese position, believing that Japan 
12 
would win a swift victory over China, Hitler inclined toward 
this position also and felt that he must support the Anti-
Comintern Pact in view of the spread of Communism in Spain 
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and China, The pact united Germany and Japan against the 
Communist threat, Germany continued to profess neutrality but by 
autumn 1937, the German government, despite the objections of 
the Foreign Office, decided to yield to Japanese demands. 
Hitler instituted his decision immediately and on 
18 October Goering issued orders to halt all arms deliveries 
to China. Goering stated that the Japanese threatened to 
withdraw fcom; the Anti-Comintern Pact: "if support of the 
Chinese by Germany was continued in its present form and that 
the Fuehrer had decided that an unequivocal attitude was to be 
13 14 
adopted toward Japan," General Wilhelni Keitel protested that 
it would not be feasible to stop all deliveries, some of which 
China had already paid for, because Germany could not return 
the payments. The Reich Minister of War von Blumberg agreed, 
and supported by the Foreign Office, pressured Goering to 
15 
rescind his order and to resume deliveries. It was quite 
clear in Berlin that an end to the Sino-Japanese war, would be 
of great benefit to Germany, both from the economic considerations 
involved and the political standpoint. The only hope was for 
German mediation in the conflict but this required political 
support in Berlin, support which Hitler would not give his 
Wilhelmstrasse diplomats. 
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The Chinese appeal to the League of Nations and the 
signatories of the Nine Power agreement resulted in a conference 
of interested states in Brussels. Japan indicated from the 
outset that she would refuse to attend because she feared 
possible collective action by the Western Powers, Hitler 
refused to participate because of his pro-Japanese inclination 
and because he feared that the conference, if successful, might 
establish a precedent in cases of future aggression. Germany's 
absence from Brussels, despite the need for friendship with 
both nations, was anti-Chinese and so by inference pro-Japanese. 
Germany could not please both powers, and her position in 
relation to the conference was an illustration of her dilemma 
in the Far East, 
The German Foreign Office attempted to mediate the 
conflict by offering its good offices to handle the exchanges 
between China and Japan, The German ambassador in China, 
Dr, Trautmann, informed the Chinese that Germany could serve as 
a mediator in the conflict because direct negotiations appeared 
16 
most promising. The Foreign Office made the first move 
because of hints received from the Japanese army and its 
representative Oshima that the time was ripe for negotiations. 
Ambassador von Dirksen received another such Japanese request 
through diplomatic channels and conveyed the message to the 
17 
Wilhelmstrasse. The Foreign Office in turn asked von Dirksen 
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if he thought the Japanese government was sincere in its 
professed desire for negotiations and instructed him to tell 
the Japanese that Germany would not exert overt pressure 
on China: 
Please tell the Japanese that in our opinion we have done 
everything possible since the outbreak of the conflict to 
exert a friendly influence on China, and we consider a 
more far-reaching pointed move premature. 18 
The Chinese expressed a willingness to hear the Japanese terms 
and they were conveyed to von Dirksen. 
The Japanese government forwarded its peace terms to 
China, stating that if China did not accept them, Japan would 
continue the war and exact harsher terms in China's complete 
defeat. The terms in brief were: Inner Mongolia was to be 
autonomous, 2. Demilitarized zones were to be created in North 
China which would be under Chinese administration and headed by 
a pro-Japanese ofxical, The demilitarized zones around 
Shanghai were to be extended, 4. China was to cease her anti-
Japanese activities by complying with certain Japanese requests, 
5. She was to join the battle against Bolshevism, 6. China was to 
reduce import duties to a lower level, 7. The rights of foreign 
powers in China were to be respected. Von Dirksen judged the 
terms acceptable to China without a loss of face and advised 
that the German military personnel be utilized to persuade 
19 
Chiang Kai-shek to agree to the terms. Von Lleurath instructed 
18 
Ibid., Series D vol. I, GFM to Dirksen 30 October 1957 No. 509 
pT~775. 
19 
Ibid., Series D vol. I, Dirksen to GPM 3 November 1937 No. 514 
pp. 778^^79. 
Trautmann to convey the terms to the Chinese, adding that 
they: "seem acceptable to us as a basis for the opening 
20 
of negotiations." 
Chiang Kai-shek read the terms and at once declared he 
could not accept them for China until Japan restored the 
status quo ante bellum in China. He realized that to negotiate 
on the Japanese proposals would mean a revolution in China with 
the Communists seizing power. Trautmann reported this to Berlin 
along with the rumor that the Chinese expected Anglo-American 
21 
support in the mediation. 
The massive Chinese defeat around Shanghai in early 
November and the general rout toward Nanking prompted the German 
diplomats to redouble their efforts to secure peace through 
direct negotiations with Japan. Von Dirksen in Japan proposed 
that the German military advisors in China be used to influence 
22 
Chiang Kai-shek, General Palkenhausen, at the request of 
Trautmann, attempted to point out the disastrous conseouences 
25 
of a prolonged v/ar to China but with no success. Yon Neurath 
pressed the Chinese ambassador in Berlin to agree to negotiate 
24 
but with similar results. There followed a temporary halt in 
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the conversations between the three parties. German diplomatic 
efforts accomplished nothing, and the diplomats could only wait 
for the seemingly inevitable collapse of China and the end 
of Germany's position in that country. 
By the end of November, 1937, even the Chinese could 
no longer delude themselves that an international conclave in 
Europe would rescue them from their plight or that the Chinese 
forces could halt the Japanese advance. These dilatory tactics 
were all too evident and, while German diplomats tried 
unsuccessfully to convince the Chinese of the necessity to give 
ground in the peace negotiations, the Japanese grew more 
impatient, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to negotiate with the Japanese 
on 3 December using the first proposals as the basis for the 
25 
talks. Germany was to act as mediator with the entire 
proceedings to be strictly secret. The Chinese also suggested 
that Hitler appeal publicly to both governments to conclude 
an armistice and cease hostilities. 
In Tokyo, the Japanese General Staff, alarmed at the 
expansion of the area of military operations and the increase 
in war expenditures, now seemed impatient in its quest for 
peace. Von Dirksen inquired if Japanese demands remained 
unchanged from the first proposals, and the Japanese Foreign 
26 
Office confirmed that there had been no change, Japan hoped 
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that Hitler would persuade Chiang Kai-shek to initiate a 
27 
peace offer to which the Japanese government would then respond, 
V/hen the armistice appeared near, the military situation 
in China outran the diplomatic negotiations. On 7 December, 
von Dirksen handed the qualified Chinese acceptance to the 
Japanese Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister expressed 
doubt if the original proposals still sufficed with the Japanese 
army ready to seize the Chinese capital at Nanking. Internal 
pressures in Japan stifled any attempts at moderation because 
the public and the young officer corps of the army, intoxicated 
by the series of new military successes, demanded adequate 
28 
compensation for their sacrifices. The army felt the pressure 
of the lower ranks—the radical wing of the army—for the 
imposition of severe terms and the army could only comply 
to these demands* 
This decision by the Japanese government stunned the 
German Foreign Office, but von Neurath nevertheless decided 
that Germany should continue to offer her good offices. He did 
instruct von Dirksen to intimate to the Japanese that Germany 
could not go transmitting in good faith to China terms which 
Japan kept extending to a harsher level. The Japanese government 
forwarded the new terms to von Dirksen on 22 December, stating 
that in view of the rapid changes in the military situation, 
the following became necessary: 1. China must abandon her 
27 
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pro-Communist and anti-Japanese policies, 2. Demilitarized 
zones and.special regimes were to be established in certain 
areas, 3» Agreements for close economic cooperation should be 
concluded between Japan, China and Manchukuo, and 4. Japan 
29 
was to paid an indemnity, Japan also demanded direct 
negotiations with no cessation of hostilities until the conclusion 
of peace, Japan insisted that China recognize Manchukuo and 
join the Anti-Comintern Pact to counter the recently concluded 
Sino-Russian Non-Aggression Pact. There were other stipulations 
for a demilitarized zone in the Yangtze Valley and a general 
tariff and trade agreement. Japan expected China's answer 
by the end of the year. 
Von Dirksen protested the threatening tone of the 
harsh Japanese peace terms and considered it improbable that 
China would accept such conditions. When von Neurath received 
the proposals, he expressed serious doubts. He finally decided 
to forward the terms to China but warned Trautmann in China to 
50 
refrain from expressing any opinion on the proposals. 
Ambassador Trautmann conveyed the Japanese terms to 
the Chinese government whose representative professed shock at 
such demands. The Chinese requested an elaboration of the 
main points and threatened to turn to Russia for aid. The 
German Foreign Office persuaded the Japanese to extend their 
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time limit and urged the Japanese government to moderate its 
31 
terms. General Falkenhausen and Trautmann did their upmost 
to convince Chiang Kai-shek to accept the terms because of 
Chinais desperate position, but the latter felt the revised 
proposals to be impossible for his country. 
The Japanese government submitted a third set of 
proposals of nine points clearly intended to wreck the 
negotiations. The new terms, an effort by the Japanese army 
to confuse the Chinese and to rupture the negotiations completely, 
were vague and indefinite. On 12 January, Trautmann, advised 
of new ominous developments on the Japanese General Staff, 
warned the Chinese government that the Japanese would wait 
32 
no longer for a reply. The Chinese Foreign Minister declared 
that the proposals of late December were too broad and that 
China wished to know the real content of the Japanese demands. 
Von Dirksen communicated this reply to the Japanese Foreign 
Office. He attempted to mollify the Japanese and suggested that 
if the negotiations were to end, world opinion would blame 
the Japanese government. 
The Japanese regarded the Chinese answer as plain 
subterfuge and lacking in sincerity. The Japanese government 
decided to attempt no further contacts with the Chinese. 
Von Dirksen expressed his regret at this hasty decision and 
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warned that the continuation of the struggle would have 
unfavorable effects on the relations between Germany and Japan. 
The war with China would worsen Anglo-Japanese relations, 
which Germany considered undesirable, and it would encourage 
Communism in China. Moreover, the protraction of the war 
33 
would weaken Japan in its ideological struggle with Russia. 
German mediation came to an end, and despite some 
half-hearted attempts by the Chinese, it could not be revived. 
The Japanese attitude in the government and in the army were of • 
such a nature to discourage all further efforts. The German 
Foreign Office, especially ambassadors von Dirksen and Trautmann, 
struggled, under extenuating circumstances, to achieve peace 
but there never was a real chance. There was a lack of 
direction in the German government, typified by Hitler's pro-
Japanese stand, which provided no basis of strength for the 
negotiations. Hitler's own foreign policy was at cross-purposes 
with the German Foreign Office. While recognizing Germany's 
considerable economic interests and political position in 
China, he refused to take any step which might jeopardize the 
alliance with Japan. Hitler moved to acknowledge Japanese 
hegemony in China and to terminate Germany's involvement in 
1 
Asiatic affairs. 
The German government acted quickly to facilitate the 
change in German foreign policy. Hitler's decision on China 
involved a change in the Foreign Office, based in part on a 
33 
Ibid., Series D vol. I, Dirksen to GFM 17 January 1938 No, 558 
p. 821. 
45 
report received from von Dirksen in Tokyo, The report 
recommended that Germany recognize Manchukuo, stop all deliveries 
of arms and munitions to China, and recall the German military 
personnel. Von Dirksen believed that China would drift into 
the Russian orbit and it would be better to withdraw the 
German advisors rather than have them collaborate with Russian 
personnel. This was necessary in order to avoid an 
34 
estrangement in relations with Japan. Hitler needed to bring 
the Foreign Office under his complete control with a change 
in the Foreign Ministry to one favorably disposed to his 
55 
pro-Japanese attitude. The one man who strongly espoused the 
appropriate position and whose chimerical outlook of world 
affairs pleased Hitler, was Ribbentrop, Hitler replaced 
von Neurath with his own lackey, Ribbentrop, on 4 February 1938. 
With the last vestiges of opposition removed, the way was now 
open for the full implementation of Nazi foreign policy. 
Hitler decided to recognize Manchukuo as an independent 
state. He publicly announced this decision in the course of a 
speech before the Reichstag on 20 February when he justified 
36 
the act as: "a sober respect for actual fact." Hitler went 
on to state: 
I cannot agree v/ith those politicans who think they do 
_ Europe a service in harming Japan, I am afraid the defeat 
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of Japan in Eastern Asia would never benefit Europe or 
America, but only Bolshevist Soviet Russia. I do not 
consider China strong enough, either spiritually or 
materially, to withstand from her ov/n resources any 
attack by Bolshevism...Germany, in the defensive attitude 
she adopts toward Communism, will always regard and 
value Japan as an element of security, and a guaranty, 
moreover, for the culture of mankind, 37 
Hitler left no doubt that while German neutrality would continue 
along with hopes for peace between China and Japan, he accepted 
the Japanese plea that they were fighting Communism in China, 
which hitherto the German Foreign Office refused to countenance. 
To emphasize the change in German foreign policy, Hitler 
recalled von Dirksen from Tokyo and replaced him with the 
military attache, now Major General Ott—an unusual event in 
German diplomatic practice and full of portent. 
The surrender of the German position in China now 
proceeded apace. Hitler and Ribbentrop were ready to sacrifice 
the goodwill of China and valuable commercial position of 
Germany in that country for the primacy of politics. Goering 
issued orders halting the export of all war material immediately 
irrespective of the dates of conclusion on the delivery 
39 
contracts. He repeated the order in May because German 
deliveries somehow kept reaching the Par East. The cancellation 
of these contracts caused a considerable loss to the German 
armament firms. The recall of German personnel, initially 
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decided in April, but delayed by Chiang Kai-shek, was of 
special concern. Ribbentrop advised Trautmann to order 
General Palkenhausen to quit his military position. Palkenhausen 
replied that such a move would be of special concern, a 
breach of contract and the men under his command would not 
leave China. Trautmann supported this decision in an attempt 
to save the German position in China. But Ribbentrop did not 
relent and was adamant. In early May he promised that the 
advisors would be withdrawn and repeated his order that the 
advisors leave as soon as possible; the German government 
paying their return fares and compensating them for their loss 
40 
of further salary. The consequent wrangle between Ribbentrop 
and Trautmann led to the recall of the ambassador. On 28 June, 
when a delay occurred in the departure of the German advisors, 
Ribbentrop ordered Trautmann to hand over his office to the 
, 41 
Charge d'affaires and return to Germany. This was the final 
blow in the self-destruction of Germany's influence in China. 
The Japanese war not only eliminated German commerce in China 
but forced Germany to relinquish her privileges in China to 
Japan. Germany's sacrifice received little recompense 
from Japan. 
The considerable German business interests in China 
which flourished in the post-war era under favorable auspices 
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faced ruin with the German retreat from China. Not only had 
the normal economic exchange been destroyed between Germany 
and China, but the extensive arms trade, at one time estimated 
to be from 50 to 80^ of China's war resources, came to an 
42 
abrupt end, Ribbentrop attempted to negotiate with the 
Japanese government for compensation of the lost industries, 
war damage claims and a guarantee of equal opportunity for 
German businessmen in China. The Japanese government would 
only promise Germany commercial opportunities as good as third 
powers because it did not want to antagonize Great Britain or 
the United States by openly violating the principle of 
equality of opportunity. The two partners could not even 
agree on the form of a projected understanding for a commercial 
treaty and the conversations deadlocked. Ribbentrop's attempt 
failed to bring German businessmen any compensation for their 
losses in China. Japan charged her toll and Germany paid 
in full the price of the Anti-Comintern Pact and for 
Japan's friendship. 
The German Foreign Office was well aware that Japan's 
ploy to eradicate Communism from China to justify the war would 
have the opposite effect in China. The Japanese army did not 
conquer China, Chiang Kai-shek refused to capitulate and 
Communism thrived under these conditions, proving to be the 
ultimate victor in the Sino-Japanese war, Japan lost her 
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calculated venture against China and unfortunately not only 
the stakes of her own empire but a substantial German interest 
as well. Japan, having seized a major portion of China in a 
surge of national expansion, would not share her gains with 
Germany. Japan had the unexampled superiority of possessing 
her strength in Asia while Germany, in the geographical 
circumstances of this situation, could not possibly hope to 
counter this through mediation. Germany, lacking other outposts 
in the Par East and dependent upon the goodwill of Great 
Britain for her connection to Asia, could not force a solution. 
Germany's earnest endeavors for peace had little chance for 
success because Japan's desires were sufficiently large to be 
prohibitive to negotiations. The German government tried to 
maintain a delicate balance between China and Japan in the Far 
East, trying to please both without offending either. The 
attempt failed and Hitler made his decision, sacrificing the 
valuable economic privileges in China to retain the political 
friendship of Japan, 
This decision appeared to be a mistake but viewed from 
its own environment in Nazi foreign policy, there v/as 
substantial justification. Nazi ideology adulated power and 
despised mercenary gain, Germany's relations with China, 
through profitable, were devoid of a forceful quality. But 
Japan, in Hitler's mind, epitomized the very sinew of strength— 
the samurai warrior state. Hitler regarded Japan as a more 
valuable ally against Russia, Great Britain or the United 
States than China could ever hope to be. From this point of 
50 
view in world strategy, Hitler resolved the German dilemma 
in the Par East and opted for Japan, That German "business 
interests suffered consequent disadvantages was unfortunate 
but Hitler calculated that to work with China, a weak nation, 
would restrict his freedom of action in foreign policy. Japan 
occupied a definite place in Hitler's world strategy and it 
was from this position that steps were taken to strengthen 
the bond between Germany and Japan with a definite military 
alliance between the two nations. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE AXIS TRIANGLE 1937-1939 
Germany in 1937 faced a new protagonist in Europe— 
Great Britain. Hitler could not settle the question of 
Lebensraum in Eastern Europe through negotiations with Great 
Britain. The accession of Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact 
presented a way in which to overcome this obstacle. The 
strategic value of Italy would be her threat to the British 
in the Mediterranean. Mussolini would act as Hitler's navy. 
The coalition assumed a new character with this challenge to 
Great Britain as well as the secret accords against Russia. 
Germany, Italy and Japan presented a formidable political 
block of nations against Great Britain and Russia but this was 
only so long as peace prevailed. The Anti-Comintern Pact did 
not have any basis for military action or assistance in 
case of aggression. 
Hitler reasoned that Japan ?/as in a similar situation 
in the Far East with the assistance that Great Britain and 
Russia gave to China. The tv/o governments had a common goal in 
their foreign policies to strengthen the coalition against 
Russia, and now Great Britain, with the creation of a 
military alliance. 
The Anti-Comintern Pact had been ostensibly directed 
against the Communist International but the secret protocols 
had provided that Germany and Japan would consult each other 
in the event of a threatened or actual attack by Russia. The 
51 
52 
pact had committed each partner to nothing more than benevolent 
neutrality and fell short of containing definite military 
obligations. Germany, in the initial negotiations, had 
favored a military commitment but then had retracted her 
proposals to assure the completion of some form of agreement 
with Japan. In 1956, the Japanese General Staff, through its 
military attache in Berlin, had offered the German government 
a military understanding but these proposals, repeated in 1957, 
were considered premature and unfavorable by Hitler, A 
technical liaison for intelligence had been established 
between the German and the Japanese General Staffs in 1957, but 
it was limited to the Russian military situation. The occasion 
for a stronger alliance, a triple alliance including Italy, 
who had adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1957, was 
considered by both Ribbentrop and Hitler, 
Ribbentrop, while ambassador to Great Britain in 1957, 
explained his views for a German military alliance with Italy 
and Japan in a memorandum to the German Foreign Office. He 
stated that a revision of Germany's position in Eastern Europe 
could only be achieved through the use of force, a policy which 
would inevitably clash v/ith the French alliance system. A war 
with Prance would bring Great Britain into the conflict but 
Ribbentrop believed that the French would not fight if they 
understood that Great Britain would not support them. This 
situation could be realized by the superior forces of a 
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coalition threatening the British Empire. If Great Britain 
could be "neutralized", Prance would cease to be a problem. 
Eibbentrop regarded Great Britain as Germany's primary enemy 
and considered a German-Italian-Japanese alliance the best 
possible method to check Great Britain in the Par East, in the 
Mediterranean and in Europe. This tripartite coalition would 
need a firm military foundation to permit no doubt about the 
2 
intentions of the signatories. These ideas soon directed 
Germany's foreign policy. 
The Japanese General Staff principally sponsored the 
strategy for a military alliance between Germany and Japan. 
The Japanese objectives centered on the conclusion of the China 
war, prolonged by the support received from Great Britain and 
Russia. An alliance might reduce this aid and Japan could 
draw an advantage once again from the European political scene. 
But the Japanese army and the Japanese government could not 
agree on the precise content of an understanding. The government 
considered an alliance specifying Russia as sufficient to 
terminate the Chinese war but the army wanted to include the 
other world powers. The divisions between the army and the 
navy compounded the situation, 
Eibbentrop initiated negotiations in January 1958, when 
he asked the military attache Oshima if the German-Japanese 
bond could not be strengthened with a military understanding. 
Oshima transmitted the proposals at once to the General Staff 
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3 
in Tokyo. Germany annexed Austria in March 1938, but Japan 
did not reply, A report from the new Japanese ambassador to 
4 
Berlin, Shigenori Togo, to the Japanese Foreign Office explained 
the silence. He considered an alliance with Germany to be 
undesirable since her policy in Europe was leading toward war. 
This dissenting opinion created friction between the civilian 
and military officals in Tokyo, causing hesitation and delay. 
The German government, with Ribbentrop as Foreign 
Minister, viewed the projected alliance with Japan as an ever 
more important facet of its foreign policy. Ribbentrop directed 
his efforts against Great Britain, v/ho now seemed to provide 
the most opposition to Germany in Europe. The early enemy, 
Russia, crippled herself with the purge trials. Ribbentrop 
offered Italy a treaty of mutual assistance within the framework 
of a tripartite coalition but the Italians refused when they 
learned that Germany had no firm agreement with Japan. Ribbentrop 
was not too successful as yet with his grand coalition. 
It took the Japanese army the entire spring of 1938 to 
realize that the war in China could not be ended by military 
means. The Japanese General Staff instructed Oshima to reopen 
discussions with Ribbentrop to negotiate a consultative pact 
against Russia. Ribbentrop replied that a consultative pact 
was weak and one-sided; instead, he proposed a mutual aid treaty 
3 
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aimed not only at Russia but against all countries, Oshima 
doubted that his government would be willing to accept such 
commitments. The Japanese Foreign Office protested any military 
commitment to Hitler, who seemed prone to risk everything for 
his ambitions. But the clash with the Russian army at Changkufeng 
in China in July 1938 quelled the opposition. The Japanese 
army, fully aware of the Russian threat in China, would pay 
the price for an alliance with Germany against Russia, even if 
the price meant commitments against other world powers, 
Ribbentrop submitted a draft of a treaty to the Japanese, 
consisting of three articles, the third of which stipulated 
military assistance in case one of the other signatories was 
5 
attacked. The Japanese government discussed the proposals 
during the first half of August and with great dispatch, 
extraordinary for the Japanese, gave their limited acceptance 
of the draft. The qualifications of the acceptance included the 
decision that all powers other than Russia would have to be 
regarded as strictly secondary and Japan's automatic participation 
in case of war could not be promised. Ribbentrop received 
this muddled acceptance from Oshima and labored under the 
impression that Japan agreed to his entire proposal. This 
mistake became the first cause for much subsequent confusion. 
The Munich crisis reached its climax and Ribbentrop's 
attention became almost wholly occupied in European affairs. 
The crisis in Europe demonstrated how easily Japan might be 
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dragged into a conflict were she allied with Germany, The 
events ig Europe caused a partial withdrawal from Japan's 
original position toward a military alliance and explained 
in part the later fruitless negotiations. 
During the Munich crisis, Ribbentrop submitted a revised 
i 
draft of the proposed tripartite pact to the Italian Foreign 
Minister, The third article of the proposed alliance now 
promised "aid and assistance" were one of the signatories to 
6 
be attacked, Ribbentrop believed that the time was right for 
an alliance. Hitler regarded v;ar as likely in four or five 
7 
years, with the western powers and Russia already in a coalition. 
Munich demonstrated how weak the western powers were and it 
only increased the tendency toward isolation in the United 
States. Hitler concluded that Japan's participation in a 
tripartite agreement could only strengthen her position 
8 
in the Pacific, 
Events in Japan reflected the confused situation in 
government circles on the question of a tripartite accord. The 
appointment of Oshima as ambassador to Germany appeared to be 
a favorable development, supporting those who sought the alliance. 
But the Japanese Foreign Office would not yield on its objections 
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against a broad pact, aimed at both the western powers and 
Russia. .This renewed hesitation, unknown to Ribbentrop, and 
the Japanese army's pressure for a full alliance caused the 
Japanese government to resign. The constant problem of the 
war in China complicated the negotiations and halted any 
further Japanese attempts to induce the Geîmans to soften 
the tone of the proposed tripartite pact. 
The Axis triumphs in Czechoslovakia and Albania, coupled 
with the protracted Chinese war, led to a réévaluation of the 
Japanese position by the new Japanese government. The government 
now decided to accept in principle the terms of the proposed 
agreement but declared that for political and economic reasons, 
Japan would not be able to sign such an accord at the present 
time for various obligations. 
Ribbentrop endeavored to convince the Italians to adhere 
to a tripartite pact. Late in 1938 Mussolini decided to 
accept the terms of the accord and Ribbentrop immediately 
9 
prepared a draft for signature in early January 1939. But when 
Ribbentrop pressed Oshima for a confirmation of Japan's 
acceptance of the draft, he learned that Japan was by no means 
ready to sign any proposal. The German plan, completely upset, 
had to accept the news in good terms in view of Japan's 
importance in the projected tripartite understanding. 
Ribbentrop, still confident that an agreement could soon 
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be reachea, received the Japanese proposals in April 1939. The 
Japanese government wanted to limit the accord to a general 
military treaty against Russia alone. All other states were 
minor objectives and Japan would onl^ participate in a war 
against them at her own discretion. Ribbentrop, greatly 
disappointed, replied that if the Japanese could not accept in 
principle military obligations against other powers, he could 
not consent to their desire to give a different interpretation 
of the pact in various explanations to these powers. He 
supported an oral agreement after the public pact had been signed 
which would practically absolve Japan from joining in active 
hostilities against any power except Russia. But Ribbentrop 
objected to any written agreement on this because if it became 
known to others, it would seriously weaken the value of the pact. 
The Japanese indecision exasperated the German 
government. Hitler did not want to conclude anything less than 
a general military treaty but Ribbentrop could not obtain this 
commitment. On 20 April Ribbentrop warned Oshima that 
should Japan continue to delay, Germany might be forced to seek 
12 
a non-aggression pact v/ith Russia, Hitler made a bid for 
Japanese support on 28 April when he stated; 
To create still closer relations between Germany, Italy 
and Japan is the constant aim of the German government. 
We regard the existance and maintenance of the freedom and 
independence of these three Great Powers as the strongest 
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factor in the future making for the preservation of a 
true human culture, a practical civilization, and a 
just order in the world, 13 
The Japanese Prime Minister responded to Hitler's 
message with a personal note on 4 May. He declared that Japan 
was honestly desirous of concluding a pact and sincere in her 
readiness to extend aid, including military assistance, to 
Germany, should she be assailed by third powers, and even if 
Russia were not among these. But in Japan's existing situation, 
she was not able to render effective military aid, at the 
moment or in the near future, although she would when 
circumstances would permit. The Prime Minister asked that 
Germany agree to a secret understanding to excuse Japan from 
her obligations of military assistance for the time being, and 
allow her to give an innocuous explanation when the pact was 
published. He added that to doubt Japan's sincerity would 
destroy the real basis for any agreement and make its future 
14 
signature impossible. 
The Japanese note failed to convince Ribbentrop of 
Japan's good faith. He suspected that if Germany agreed to a 
secret written agreement of the kind that Japan wanted, the 
Japanese government would use the public pact to try to 
blackmail the major powers in the Pacific. If this proved 
unsuccessful, the government might then reveal the secret 
provisions of the pact to these powers as proof that Japan was 
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not irrevocably committed to a war against them if they became 
engaged in a war against the Axis, Germany and Italy, in Europe, 
Ribbentrop concluded a bilateral agreement, "the Pact of 
Steel", with Italy although he did not altogether abandon the 
idea of a tripartite agreement. But the conclusion of a separate 
German-Italian accord meant that Hitler's interest in the 
15 
Japanese pact was not as strong as before, 
Ribbentrop sent new drafts of the latest revision of the 
16 
proposed tripartite pact to Japan on 15 May, The revised draft 
stressed the defensive nature of the agreement, giving Japan 
the right to state that it was directed primarily against 
Russia, But Japan could not give assurances that it would 
operate against that power alone, or that under no circumstances 
would Japan engage in hostilities against the western powers. 
These were substantial concessions by the German government, 
Ribbentrop instructed his ambassador in Tokyo to urge the 
Japanese government to accept, pointing out that the consolidation 
of Japan's position in Asia under the "Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere" depended on the Axis being superior to 
their opponents, Japan could not allow these hostile powers 
to assume they could count on Japan's neutrality in the event 
17 
of a war in Europe, 
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Renewed fighting around Komonhan in northern China 
between Russia and Japan in May 1939» and the new German 
proposals provoked a crisis in the Japanese government. The 
army wanted to sign an agreement immediately, but the navy 
vigorously opposed any commitment against the major powers, 
including the United States. The navy pleaded that Japan could 
not survive economically with the oceans dominated by the 
combined fleets of the major world powers. On 21 May the 
Japanese government issued a statement indicating that while 
Japan sympathized with Germany and Italy in desiring changes 
in the territorial status quo, Japan had to maintain her 
freedom of action. The offical signature of the "Pact of 
Steel" on 22 May spurred the Japanese government to make one 
more supreme- effort to conclude a treaty with Germany. 
The Japanese government formulated a compromise in a 
stormy meeting on 5 June. The proposal embodied practically 
all of the points of Ribbentrop's revised draft of May. Japan 
agreed not to inform the major powers about the nature of the 
agreement and also conceded to the German demand for at least 
pro-forma participation in case of an Anglo-German war. But 
the government instructed Oshima to inform Ribbentrop that 
Japan would be unable to render effective military aid for 
some time. The Japanese proposal had one reservation; while 
in case of war with Russia her entry would be automatic, in all 
other instances Japan wished to reserve her freedom of choice 
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19 
in declaring war until the appropriate moment. Ribhentrop, 
faced, with a possible Anglo-Russian entente, rejected the 
Japanese offer, refusing to accept anything other than an oral 
declaration on Japanese entry into the war. The Ribbentrop-
Oshima talks deadlocked and came to an end in mid-June. 
Hitler decided to move against Poland and his first task 
was to isolate that country in Europe. His approach to Russia 
in May was a serious effort to avoid a two-front war. If 
Japan would not sign a military treaty, perhaps Russia would 
agree to mutual guarantees—there would be harm in trying 
both ways. On 25 May 1939 at a military conference, Hitler 
explained the German position with Japan: 
Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various 
reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat 
cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own 
interests to take the initiative in attacking Russia 
in good time. 20 
Hitler wanted to take no chances. He would forestall the 
major powers without an alliance with Japan. Hitler ordered 
Ribbentrop to prceed with the negotiations for a German-Russian 
21 
non-aggression pact. 
The news of the non-aggression pact between Germany and 
Russia stunned Oshima and shocked the Japanese government. The 
government considered the signature an extremely dangerous. 
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treacherous act and a contravention of the Anti-Comintern Pact, 
The German-Russian agreement destroyed the whole basis of 
22 
Japanese foreign policy in Europe. Ribbentrop argued that 
Japan could not stand apart. If Great Britain and Russia, 
both of whom opposed Japan in China, defeated the Axis in 
Europe, Japan would be isolated, Japan would also face a 
hostile United States, who could be reckoned as a potential 
enemy. Ribbentrop instructed Ott to advise the Japanese 
government that Germany had no alternative owing to the 
23 
critical situation in Europe, 
Hitler did not feel any anxiety from the bitter 
Japanese reaction, indeed he appeared optimistic almost to the 
point of being megalomaniacal. Addressing his military leaders 
at Obersalzberg on 22 August, he exclaimed that: "since 
Autumn 1938, I have found out that Japan does not go with us 
24 
without conditions..,! have decided to go with Stalin," 
He went on: 
We must take into account the defection of Japan. I have 
left to Japan a whole year's time to decide. The Emperor 
is the companion piece of the late Czars. Weak, cowardly, 
irresolute, he may fall before a revolution. My association 
with Japan was never popular. We will furthermore cause 
unrest in the Par East... Let us think of ourselves as 
masters and consider these people at best as lacquered 
half-monkeys, who need to feel the knout. 25 
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Hitler's opinion of the Japanese was not high. He realized 
that without a firm military agreement, Japan would be of 
little use to Germany. Hitler expressed these thoughts to 
Mussolini three days later: 
Japan would probably agree to an alliance against Russia, 
which would have only a secondary interest, under prevailing 
circumstances, for Germany, and in my opinion, for Italy 
also. She would not, however, undertake definite obligations 
against England, and this, from the standpoint not only 
of Germany, but also of Italy, was of decisive importance. 26 
Political expediency forced Hitler to conclude his pact with 
Russia to insure the success of his war against Poland. Japan 
simply would not ally herself with the Axis and Hitler did not 
want a partner who would not strengthen his position in 
Europe. Thus ended the abortive negotiations of 1959 for a 
tripartite agreement. 
The failure of the negotiations for a tripartite pact 
in 1939 was due in part to two illusions which dominated Hitler's 
world strategy. He made a mistake in his general diplomatic 
calculations. Hitler sought an alliance with Japan in order to 
"neutralize" Great Britain by posing a threat to her empire 
through a tripartite coalition. Faced v/ith antagonists in 
Europe, the Mediterranean, and in the Par East, Great Britain 
would not fight and Prance, not daring to oppose Germany alone, 
would cease to be a problem. Russia, confronted with a hostile 
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Germany and Japan on either side, would be too isolated to 
offer any resistance. This international manipulation of 
world politics far exceeded the diplomatic ability of Hitler 
and certainly was beyond the grasp of Ribbentrop. Hitler's 
belief that he could accomplish this diplomatic coup was the 
first fallacy in his world strategy. 
The second illusion v/as even more significant in Hitler's 
relations with Japan. Hitler simply did not comprehend the 
national objectives of Japan's foreign policy, which were not 
the same as his own. Hitler wanted the J^anese alliance to 
cause difficulties for the major powers in their colonial 
possessions in the Par East, But Japan hoped to settle the 
Chinese war by having Germany start a vfar in Europe, or at 
least create- such unrest there that Great Britain, Prance and 
Russia would be unable to devote their attention to the Par 
East. This difference in national policies by each ally meant 
a different interpretation of a potential military understanding; 
Germany wanted a general inclusive alliance and Japan only a 
limited one. Japan realized that if she signed a general 
military alliance, Japan might have to carry the main burden of 
the war and face greater odds because of her economic dependence 
on the high seas. This conflict in foreign policy objectives 
was the ultimate reason for the absence of a German-Japanese 
coalition in 1939 and constituted the second fallacy in 
Hitler's world strategy. 
CHAPTER V 
THE TRIPARTITE PACT 1939-1940 
The conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression 
Pact shocked the Japanese government, Rihbentrop warned the 
Japanese diplomats that if they continued to delay and 
procrastinate over the terms of the proposed tripartite pact, 
Germany might be forced to turn to Russia for her ovm safety in 
1 
Europe. This warning in April and a similar one in June by 
Ribbentrop did not convice Japan that Germany was indeed serious 
2 
in her intentions, Oshima believed that Ribbentrop used these 
threats as a bluff to get the Japanese government to sign the 
agreement and Germany would not deliberately violate the 
Anti-Comintern Pact, 
Japan found herself deserted, almost dismissed by 
Germany in favor of her worst enemy, Russia. Hitler's latest 
diplomatic deceit came at a critical time for the Japanese, 
fighting throughout the summer in a border war against the 
Russians. The Japanese government highly resented the German 
action because it appeared to give Russia a free hand in the 
Par East against Japan. The new German-Russian Non-Aggression 
Pact for all intents and purposes rendered the Anti-Comintern 
Pact a worthless scrap of paper. The German-Japanese entente 
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entered a new period of crisis and hostility. 
!&he Reich State Secretary Weizsaecker told Oshima the 
news and then urged that Japan consider collaboration among 
the three powers. Such a move could help settle the Japanese 
differences with Russia, a point the German government never 
3 
failed to stress thereafter, Ribbentrop instructed Ott to 
explain the German position to the Japanese government in Tokyo. 
Ott endeavored to assuage Japanese feelings when he met with 
the Japanese Foreign Minister on 25 August, Ott explained the 
motives for the pact in regard to Germany's critical position 
in Europe at the moment, Germany had no alternative and the 
German-Russian agreement would be of benefit to Japan since it 
would enable the German government to use its influence for the 
4 
improvement of Japanese-Russian relations. 
The beginning of war on 1 September initiated a new 
diplomatic effort by Ribbentrop to convince the Japanese 
government of the benefits of the new alliance with Russia, 
In German foreign policy, the treaty with Stalin was not a 
breach of trust, because the abortive alliances with Japan in 
1936 was against Russia, Great Britain, not Russia, was now 
the enemy and the war only intensified this German attitude, 
Ribbentrop met with Oshima and argued that Japan's fate hinged 
on a German victory in Europe, If Germany was to lose, a 
coalition of the western powers and the United States would soon 
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deprive Japan of her Par Eastern possessions. He proposed 
that Japan take advantage of the German detente with Russia and 
allow the German government to mediate to secure a Japanese-
Russian rapprochement and a possible diplomatic accord. Such 
an agreement between Japan and Russia could end the frontier 
problems in China and allow Japan to extend her influence 
5 
southward for further expansion against Great Britain. 
The new Japanese government, the last one having fallen 
on the news of the German-Russian pact in late August, received 
the proposals in not a wholly unfavorable atmosphere. Many 
extremists advocated a German-Russian-Japanese alliance with a 
rapid advance against British interests in the south. The 
Japanese army was not opposed to the plan but the forces against 
such an alliance did not forget Germany's conduct in August. 
Those opposed remained adamant in their opposition to an 
alliance and the removal of several pro-German officals in the 
new government strengthened this opposition. There would be 
no alliance at this time. 
Japan, seemingly isolated after the German-Russian pact, 
found that the war in Europe gave her great freedom of action 
in the Far East. The Japanese government declared its 
neutrality—or non-involvement in the war as it preferred to call 
it—on 4 September. The government then proceeded to ask the 
belligerent powers to voluntarily withdraw their troops and 
ships from China in order to avoid incidents. The undeclared 
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war between Japan and Russia on the Chinese border came to an 
abrupt h^t. The Japanese army, unprepared to fight a long 
war with Russia and without German support, desired a quick 
truce. The Japanese ambassador to Russia, Togo, arranged the 
truce on 16 September without German diplomatic aid. Japan 
now appeared to be free to advance in Asia with her major 
antagonists involved in war in Europe, and with the Russian 
problem temporarily settled in the north. 
6 
Hitler and Ribbentrop received General Juichi Terauchi 
of the Japanese General Staff in November 1959, and attempted 
to reconcile the recent hostility between the two nations. 
Both men pointed out that no divergence of political interests 
existed between Berlin and Tokyo and that any division would 
only aid their mutual enemies. Ribbentrop said that Germany 
signed the accord with Russia alone but that he talked with 
Stalin about the question of a Russian-Japanese agreement, and 
Stalin declared: "if the Japanese desire war, they can have 
7 
war, if they desire an understanding, they can have that too." 
General Terauchi agreed with the German position and Ribbentrop 
promised to work for such an accord between the three nations. 
Ribbentrop did press for a Russo-Japanese agreement in 
Moscow after the victory in Poland but the Japanese ambassador 
Togo, wary of the Germans, refused to give his support to 
z 
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8 
the scheme. Hitler reassured Oshima that Germany had no 
interest-in territorial acquisitions in Asia and that each 
nation had separate, distinct interests. He did not want 
Japan to enter the war and wished only that she recognize 
9 
Great Britain as the common enemy» Bibbentrop repeated this 
statement in a discussion with the new Japanese ambassador 
10 
to Berlin* These diplomatic maneuvers reflected the course 
of the war late in 1939 and the knowledge that Great Britain 
did not intend to allow Germany to have Eastern Europe. This 
meant a long war and Germany wanted to secure her friendship 
with Japan as a part of German world strategy. 
Hitler's sudden change in foreign policy with the 
German-Russian pact caused much consternation and profound 
indignation in Tokyo, Japan appeared utterly isolated and 
under ordinary circumstances this might have ended the German-
Japanese relationship. But Hitler and Ribbentrop believed 
that Japan's animosity would be of short duration and that she 
11 
would soon follow Germany's lead. This conclusion was correct 
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for several reasons, all of which contributed to make the 
diplomatic crisis between the two nations only a small interlude, 
Japan's own aggressive intentions drove her back to 
the Axis camp. The war in Europe and the subsequent political 
upheavals opened the rich European colonies for conquest. The 
truce with Russia ended the border war in the north and Japan 
could now conduct a more aggressive policy in the Far East, 
taking advantage of the international situation created by 
Germany. The diplomatic crisis quickly passed v/ith these 
advantages available. Ribbentrop now only would have to wait 
for the events in Europe to induce Japan to seek a military 
alliance with Germany to assure her share of the German victories. 
The end of the "Phoney War" and the collapse of Prance led to 
the climax in Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan. 
The conquest of Norway and the cataclysmic events in 
May 1940, with the invasion of the low countries and Prance 
caused a resurgence of Germany's more familiar line of foreign 
policy. In 1958 Ribbentrop expounded the idea of posing a 
triple threat to the British Empire to "neutralize" Great 
Britain and isolate Prance. The plan did not succeed in 1958-
1939 but in 1940 such an idea acquired a new look. Hitler 
repeatedly stated that Great Britain's failure to capitulate 
was attributable only to the hope that the United States would 
enter the v/ar on her side. Obviously the United States needed 
to be "neutralized" to prevent her from supplying Great Britain 
72 
to any extent and to force the English to surrender. This 
desired situation could best be achieved with a German-Japanese 
military agreement which would pose a threat to the United 
States in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic, This idea 
quickly matured' in German diplomacy through the summer of 1940 
12 
when United States support assumed unexpected proportions. 
Japan viewed the German domination of Europe and 
considered it the right time for closer relations with the Axis 
through a military alliance. A new Japanese government, headed 
15 
by Prince Fumimaro Konoye and the pro-German Foreign Minister 
14 
Yasuki Matsuoka, believed the situation highly favorable for 
the construction of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" 
in Asia. Japan did not want to lose the Dutch East Indies or 
the extensive British possessions and suspected that the German 
government might develop aspirations for its own colonial 
empire. The Japanese navy feared the British fleet, but since 
the United States still appeared unwilling to emerge from her 
isolation, it was clear in Tokyo that Japan could waste no time 
in placing her claims for territories in Asia. The Japanese 
government formulated a policy to facilitate these actions, 
12 
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hoping that because of Japan's geographical isolation, it could 
maintain an independent course in foreign affairs and profit 
from the German victories in Europe. 
Germany had no war obligations to Japan and remembered 
with rancour her previous hesitation over a proposed military 
alliance. Hitler, inflated by his victories in the summer, 
and believing peace to be near with Great Britain, did not 
wish to undertake any diplomatic step which might antagonize 
Great Britain and force her to continue the war. 
The diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, 
slowed by the war in early 1940, now increased because of the 
nev/ developments in Europe and in Japan. Ambassador Ott 
reported that Japan asked about the German position on French 
Indo-Ghina and the Dutch East Indies. Ott replied that Germany 
had no interest in these areas as long as Japan would pledge 
to keep the United States occupied in the Pacific, possibly 
by an attack on the Philippines or Hawaii if the United States 
15 
decided to join Great Britain in the war against the Axis. 
Eibbentrop met with a special Japanese envoy to discuss 
their foreign policies. The Japanese government, striving for 
a new order in Asia, had to stay on good terms with Russia 
and to protect herself from the United States fleet in the 
Pacific, Eibbentrop countered with the statement that Japan 
seemed disinterested in European affairs and hinted that the 
Japanese government should present a more concrete approach 
15 
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16 
If it expected to reach some accord with Germany. Hitler's 
peace offer to Great Britain in his speech on 19 July 1940 
and its rejection dispelled any hopes of a short war. The 
German government, disregarding the past diplomatic failures, 
renewed its efforts for a military alliance with Japan. 
Germany faced the prospect of a long T?ar and one in which 
United States intervention could not be ruled out in Europe. 
The first signs of a rift in the German-Russian partnership 
17 
appeared and Hitler already spoke of an attack against Russia. 
The German government believed it necessary to secure Japan to 
the Axis alliance and if necessary, make concessions to achieve 
this adherence. 
State Secretary Weizsaecker met the Japanese ambassador, 
who talked of a possible alliance and Japan's new order in 
the Far East. Japan would not exclude European states, provided 
they recognized Japan's leadership in the Par East and restricted 
18 
their activities to commercial matters. The German government 
hesitated through the month of August, waiting to evaluate 
the outcome of the air war over Great Britain. The reluctance 
on the part of Germany to act decisively reflected the strain 
of the invasion preparations and Hitler's uncertain territorial 
ambitions with the conquered colonial empires of the French 
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Republic and the Netherlands. 
Eibbentrop dispatched his confidential agent, Heinrich 
19 
Stumer, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan at the end of 
August with instructions concerning a military alliance. 
Ribbentrop instructed his emissary to ascertain the actual 
intentions of the Japanese government toward Germany and, if 
favorable, to open negotiations in conjunction with Ott should 
Japan show any inclination to conclude an agreement. Stahmer 
was to report every detail of all conversations to Ribbentrop 
for approval and advice. The German special envoy arrived in 
Tokyo on 7 September to conduct the negotiations. 
Japan had good reason to desire an alliance with 
Germany, Hitler's uncertain attitude toward the Far East upset 
the Japanese plans for a new order in Asia. This reluctance 
indicated that Germany might have her own plans in the Par East, 
something Japan could not tolerate in view of her own economic 
needs. This uncooperative attitude worried the Japanese 
government but it was the policy of the United States, more 
than anything else, that led to an alliance with Germany. 
The agreement between the United States and Canada at Ogdensberg 
to coordinate their national defense in August stressed the 
solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. The announcement from 
London of the projected lease of British bases to the United 
States in exchange for fifty destroyers made a profound 
impression upon the Japanese government. It feared that the 
19 
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United States fleet might move to Singapore or Hong Kong, 
bolstering Great Britain's determination to continue the war. 
The Japanese government acted immediately to formulate 
terms for an accord when they received the news that Ribbentrop's 
special envoy would be in Tokyo, The quickly concluded 
document was a fundamental agreement announcing that the three 
parties, Germany, Italy and Japan, would cooperate in establishing 
their respective spheres of influence in Europe and in Asia. 
The Axis powers would invite Russia to join and all four 
nations work together to prevent the United States from acting 
outside her own hemisphere, Japan would assist her allies 
with all means short of war but would reserve the right to 
enter into a war against Great Britain or the United States 
20 
until the proper moment. Japan had three motives in these 
terms: she hoped to render Russia and the United States 
inactive with a tripartite alliance, secondly she expected 
to end the material support to China and finally, by 
eliminating the Chinese v»'ar and neutralizing Russia and the 
United States, Japan could move south to conquer those areas 
left by the defeated colonial powers. 
The United States grant of fifty destroyers to Great 
Britain caused consternation in Berlin, Hitler realized that 
Great Britain was not likely to surrender under these 
circumstances. The agreement between the two nations contained 
a provision for the future possibility of leases to the United 
States in the Mediterranean or at strategic points close to 
20 
IITPE Exhibit 541, record pp. 8318-19. 
77 
Europe. This implied the threat of direct intervention which 
Hitler wished to avoid at all costs. In order to forestall 
the United States from intervention in Europe, Hitler directed 
Ribbentrop to conclude an alliance with Japan. Such an 
agreement would surround the United States on two sides and 
might prevent her from giving material support to Great Britain. 
Under these orders, Stahmer and Ott met with the 
Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuoka to negotiate the terms of 
an alliance. Stahmer explained Germany's position. Germany 
did not Yfant the European conflict to develop into a world war 
but desired to terminate it as soon as possible. Germany in 
particular wished to avoid United States participation, which 
Ribbentrop considered unlikely, but not impossible. Ribbentrop 
felt that if was more likely that the United States would 
act against Japan. Therefore an agreement between Germany and 
Japan would be mutually advantageous in deterring the United 
States from intervention in Europe or in the Par East. Germany 
at this time did not seek military assistance from Japan 
against Great Britain but only wanted Japan to help restrain 
the United States. The German government acknowledged Japanese 
hegemony in the Par East and asked only for economic privileges 
22 
and assistance in securing strategic raw materials. Germany 
requested Japan to assume a strong, determined position toward 
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the United States in the hope that such a display would tend 
to restrain the latter's policies and material support. 
Ott, Stahmer and Matsuoka conducted the negotiations 
for a draft treaty in the strictest secrecy. The three diplomats 
finished their work on 11 September and Ott wired Ribbentrop 
that the two parties had agreed on a draft but that there were 
still some questions the Japanese government desired to have 
23 
clarified in secret protocols. The major difference of opinion 
arose over the wording of what became article three, in which 
the contracting powers defined their obligations in the event 
of an outside attack. The original Japanese draft was vague 
and non-commital. Stahmer submitted a more precise counterdraft 
providing that if a party to the pact was attacked by a power 
not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese 
conflict, the other members would resist with all possible 
political, economic and military means. Ribbentrop also 
wanted the military obligations of article three to operate 
when one of the three powers concerned was "either openly or 
in concealed form" attacked by a power not involved in either 
war. This stipulation would be directed against United 
States military assistance to Great Britain. 
Matsuoka strongly objected to this clause and 
successfully deleted the passage. The draft treaty went to a 
special meeting of the Japanese cabinet on 16 September and 
Ribbentrop left for Rome on 19 September to inform Italy. 
Ribbentrop made one more attempt to broaden the Japanese 
23 
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obligations under article three with a nev/ revision on 21 
September. This draft read that if a power not involved in 
the European war or in the Far Eastern conflict "committed 
acts of aggression" against one of the contracting powers, 
Germany, Italy and Japan would "undertake to declare war on 
such a power and to assist one another with all political, 
24 
economic and military means". Ribbentrop declared that this 
declaration would effectively deter the United States from 
entering the war if the pact stated in clear and impressive 
terms that the United States would be automatically at war. 
But the Japanese navy strongly opposed this definite commitment 
to declare v/ar and the Germans reluctantly gave way. 
The negotiators agreed on the text of the Tripartite 
Pact and its secret accords on 23 September and transmitted the 
25 
pact to Berlin and Rome, Ribbentrop insisted that the pact be 
signed in Berlin, much to Matsuoka's displeasure. Ribbentrop 
in turn agreed to the English translations of the text to 
faciliate matters for the Japanese Privy Council and not delay 
ratification to compare separate language texts for discrepancies. 
All parties approved the text of the draft treaty and signed 
the Tripartite Pact in Berlin on 27 September 1940, 
The Tripartite Pact itself consisted of a preamble and 
six articles. The three parties, in defense of their new 
orders and in the quest of peace, recognized in articles one 
24 
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and two their respective spheres of interest in Europe and in 
the Par East. Article three, the military basis of the 
treaty, stated: 
Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts 
on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one 
another with all political, economic and military means if 
one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power 
at present not involved in the European war or in the 
Chinese-Japanese conflict. 26 
To implement the pact, the respective governments would appoint 
joint commissions. The three powers also stipulated in article 
five that the pact affected in no way the existing political 
status between the signatories and Russia. The Tripartite Pact 
27 
would remain in force for ten years. 
Certain additional provisions, embodied in an exchange 
of letters between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ott, 
contained the secret accords to the public agreement. These 
represented the German concessions for the alliance with Japan. 
Germany agreed that the question whether one of the parties 
to the treaty had or had not been attacked would be decided by 
consultation among the three parties to the treaty and Japan 
would be free to choose her ov/n time to enter the war. Germany 
would render full military and economic assistance to Japan 
in event of an attack while in the meantime, Germany would 
give Japan all possible technical and material aid to prepare 
for any military emergency. In the event of war between Japan 
2S 
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and Great Britain, Germany would afford all possible assistance. 
Japan would keep the former German possessions in the Pacific, 
Other ex-German colonies nov/ held by Japan would be returned 
upon the conclusion of the European war, but Germany would agree 
to sell such territories back to Japan. Finally, Germany 
28 
promised to work for a detente between Japan and Russia. 
The reaction to the Tripartite Pact in Japan accentuated 
the divisions in the Japanese government. Foreign Minister 
Matsuoka declared that the agreement would help to accomplish 
the objectives of Japanese foreign policy in China and in Asia. 
An offical spokesman for the Japanese government stated that 
the treaty was not directed against any specific power, and 
should be viewed as a mutual aid pact rather than a military 
29 
alliance. Others in offical circles regarded the signature of the 
pact as a tremendous gamble on the part of the Japanese 
government that Germany v;ould defeat Great Britain. There was 
a notable lack of enthusiasm in the press for the treaty, 
signifying a large measure of public disapproval. 
Ribbentrop's speech at the signature of the treaty in 
Berlin was the offical belligerent attitude of the German 
government. The Foreign Minister stated: 
The pact now signed is a military alliance between three of 
the most powerful states on earth. Above all it proposes 
to bring peace to the world as soon as possible...any State 
which might harbor the intention of interfering in the final 
phase of the solution of these problems in Europe or in 
28 
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Eastern Asia, on. attacking any signatory of the three 
power pact, will have to reckon with the entire massed 
energy of the three nations embracing 250 million people. 
This means that the Pact will, in any event serve the 
restoration of peace. 30 
The German press called the new alliance a serious defeat 
for British diplomacy and the end to all hope for intervention 
of any third parties. Hitler also voiced his pleasure about 
Japan's collaboration with the Axis. The Tripartite Pact was 
to be the high point in Germany's diplomatic relations 
with Japan, 
The reaction of the other world powers was not great. 
Most felt that this coalition had been in the process of 
formation for a long time and was the logical outcome of 
31 
Japanese foreign policy since 1931. The addition of one more 
alliance to the cauldron of war for half the world did not 
seem that important. 
One condition of the secret accords to the Tripartite 
Pact was Germany's promise to mediate the differences between 
the Japanese and Russia. Certainly one important inducement 
to the Japanese government to conclude the agreement with 
Germany was its expectation that the agreement would improve 
Japan's relations with Russia. Ribbentrop described the pact 
as the logical result of Germany's foreign policy to promote 
friendly relations between Russia and Japan. A reconciliation 
30 
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between Russia and Japan would allow all four powers to act 
32 
in concert to define their spheres of influence. Ribbentrop 
33 
Invited Vyacheslov llolotov, the Russian Foreign Minister, to 
Berlin to discuss those issues concerning Russia, Japan and 
Germany, Molotov arrived for a two-day visit in Berlin 
on 12 November 1940. 
Ribbentrop expressed the German desire for an agreement 
among the Axis, Russia and Japan designating their respective 
spheres of interest for the four powers. Germany possessed 
only a commercial interest in the Par East with the Tripartite 
Pact meant to regulate only European conditions, Germany 
wanted to conclude an agreement with Russia dividing Europe, 
with Russia doing the same with Japan in the Par East. The 
four powers then could decide on a suitable partition of 
the British Empire. 
Molotov countered with a demand that German-Russian 
cooperation would have to be settled first. The Russian 
government would agree to a four-power pact if Japan would 
renounce her concessions on the island of Sakhalin, Hitler 
promised a great coalition from Gibraltar to Vladivostok if 
Russia would join with the Axis and Japan for harmony in 
34 
the Par East. 
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Eibbentrop made one more attempt to convince Molotov 
of the necessity to cooperate and to define the outlines for the 
great partition of the Eastern Hemisphere. He produced a 
draft of a treaty with the signatories of the Tripartite Pact 
on one hand and Russia on the other, agreeing to prevent the 
extension of the v/ar, to respect their separate "natural spheres 
of interest" and to join no combination against each other. 
Ribbentrop told Molotov that Japan wanted a non-aggression 
pact with Russia and would be quite generous, recognizing Outer 
Mongolia and Sinkiang as being in the Russian sphere of influence. 
Molotov replied that negotiations with Japan would be difficult 
35 
and laboriously complex. 
The Molotov visit to Berlin was a climactic moment in 
German-Russian relations and its failure ruined any expectations 
of the Japanese government for a negotiated settlement through 
the Tripartite Pact. The negotiations resulted in no agreement 
among the four powers and for Japan, it did nothing to solve 
the China war. Japan experienced her first disillusionment 
with the Tripartite Pact and, along with the refusal of Great 
Britain to surrender, it meant a sharp setback for the "Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". German mediation did not 
produce a detente v/ith Russia and henceforth, Japan would 
return to direct negotiations with the Russian government. 
Hitler, angered by Molotov's hostile attitude, concluded that 
there was but one solution to the problem. On 18 December 1940 
Hitler signed War Directive No. 21 OPERATION BARBARGSSA for 
55 
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The Tripartite Pact was a political treaty for the 
authoritarian new order of the Axis. It supported a policy of 
worldwide intimidation directed against the United States and 
Russia and a proposed division of the disintegrating British 
Empire. In September 1940 a military alliance made little 
sense to a victorious Germany but she feared the persistent 
support of the United States to Great Britain. Germany signed 
the treaty in the hope that the addition of Japan to the 
Axis alliance would force the British to negotiate for peace 
and isolate the United States from intervention. 
Germany and Japan were reborn soldier states opposed to 
the effete western powers. Their totalitarian governments 
represented the embodiment of a new international political 
order for world domination. The Tripartite Pact promoted this 
political system for the mutual advantage of Germany and Japan. 
The policy of worldwide intimidation focused on the 
danger of the United States. Germany gained an ally in the 
Pacific to force the United States to divide her forces and to 
weaken her support to Great Britain. Japan hoped that German 
mediation could secure Russian neutrality so that she might 
conquer the rich colonial possessions in Southeast Asia. 
The division of the British Empire would help Germany 
weaken the resistance of Great Britain in Europe if Japan 
would sever the vital outposts in the Par East from the home 
86 
Islands» Germany stood to gain immensely if Japan seized 
the major military possessions in Asia. Such actions by the 
Japanese government would shift United States interest 
to the Pacific. 
The Tripartite Pact was the climax in Germany's 
diplomatic relations with Japan. The pact was a political 
accord and could not be used for military purposes because of 
the geographical separation between Germany and Japan. Distance 
made their collaboration impossible as did the differences 
in their foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, the pact did 
represent a serious political menace and a veiled military 
threat to the United States with the distinct possibility of a 
two-front war. But the alliance increased the importance of 
the United States without intending to do so. Germany wanted 
to gain time to defeat Great Britain before the United States 
entered the v/ar. But Hitler made the fatal decision to invade 
Russia. This decision, unknown to the Japanese government, 
made the Tripartite Pact in actual practice an unworkable 
military alliance whose political value deteriorated as the 
war expanded into a global conflict in June 1941. 
CHAPTER VI 
WAR 1940-JUNE 1941 
The failure of the German-Russian conferences in 
November 1940 placed Germany and Japan at opposite ends in 
their relations with Russia in 1941. The Japanese government 
believed that Germany would be able to improve Russo-Japanese 
relations but when the German-Russian entente began to 
deteriorate, it refused to face reality. Germany prepared 
for a massive attack against Russia in the spring and Hitler 
did not feel that it was necessary to inform his ally 
of the invasion. 
Germany wanted Japan to take the intiative in the Pacific 
and seize the British stronghold of Singapore. Hitler hoped to 
defeat Great Britain by indirect means through an attack on 
Singapore. This move would be extremely advantageous because 
it would mean one more setback for the tottering British 
nation and remove a major obstacle to Japan's "Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". 
The German motives for a Japanese attack on Singapore 
were consonant with the spirit of the recently signed Tripartite 
Pact. In a naval intelligence estimate in January 1941 the 
chief of Naval Operations expressed the view: 
It must and can be assumed that if America's entry into the 
war is provoked by steps taken by Japan, the United States 
will not commit the main part of her fleet in the European 
theatre... it is in our interest to encourage the Japanese 
to take any initiative she considers within her power in 
the Par Eastern area, as this would be most likely to keep 
87 
88 
American forces from the European theatre in addition to 
weakening and tying down British forces. 
We can accept the risk that such action by Japan might 
bring about America's entry into the war on the side of 
Britain, since, so far as naval warfare is concerned, 
the total advantages outweigh the total disadvantages. 1 
This apparent willingness to risk v/ar with the United States 
was contingent on the Japanese government seizing Singapore 
and threatening the United States. 
Hitler and Ribbentrop labored under the illusion that 
they could influence the Japanese government in its foreign 
policy with the provisions of the Tripartite Pact. Germany did 
not possess the means to force the Japanese government to do 
anything against its will and to depend upon Ribbentrop's 
diplomatic skill was a dubious thing indeed. Japan shrev/dly 
sought to profit from Germany's military efforts, to maintain 
her freedom of action and to decide for herself v/hen and where 
to go to war. Japan played a waiting game, promising action 
but setting no date and so leaving open her policy. These 
traits of Japanese diplomacy confused the German government 
and did not further Germany's foreign policy in 1941. 
Ribbentrop met with the new Japanese ambassador General 
Oshima at Puschl on 23 February 1941 in an attempt to persuade 
Japan to capture Singapore. Germany had no further military 
tasks on the continent because the Axis partners were victorious; 
all that remained was to convince the British government to 
recognize the fact. The main problem for the members of the 
I 
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Tripartite Pact was an extension of the alliance's usefulness. 
Hitler wished to bring the war to a close as soon as possible. 
Japan could play a decisive role if she would act at once to 
annihilate Great Britain's key position in the Par East: 
Singapore. Ribbentrop stated: -
Japan in its own interest would be right to enter the 
war as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be 
an attack on Singapore...it must be carried out with 
lightning speed and if at all possible v/ithout a 
declaration of war.... 2 
Ribbentrop summarized the reasons for quick action: 1. A 
surprise move against Singapore meant a decisive blow against 
the core of British imperialism; 2. The suddenness of the 
operation would help keep the United States out of the war 
since she lacked armaments to take such a risk; and It 
in Japan's own interest to secure her new order in the Par 
East before a peace settlement had been agreed on. 
Oshima replied that he favored such an attack on 
Singapore but said such an operation would be difficult. It 
would require seizure of the Malay peninsula and Japan needed 
3 
time to prepare. The conference ended on this pessimistic 
note. Ribbentrop continued to pursue the matter with a strong 
note to Ott in Tokyo, urging him to use all means to induce 
4 
Japan to seize Singapore. 
Hitler, in the middle of his preparations for the 
2 
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invasion of Russia, issued War Directive No, 24 Regarding 
Cooperation with Japan on 5 March to explain his position 
on Japan. He stated in the directive: 
It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the 
Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to 
take active measures in the Par East... The Barbarossa 
Operation will create most favorable and military 
prerequisites for this. The seizure of Singapore as the 
key British possession in the Par East would mean a 
decisive success for the conduct of the war of the three 
Powers... The Japanese must not be given any intimation 
of the Barbarossa Operation, 5 
Hitler evidently thought that the Japanese might betray the 
plan to Moscow as a means to obtain a non-aggression pact 
with Russia. Hitler's order was part of his political strategy 
with Japan against the United States. This decision not to 
inform the Japanese government was to have serious consequences 
for Germany at a later date and an adverse effect in Japan. 
Hitler evinced a general desire to keep the United 
States out of the war in Europe. He sought to prevent diplomatic 
incidents in the Atlantic and to refuse any challenge which 
might lead to United States intervention. Hitler hoped to 
divert the United States to the Pacific by encouraging Japan to 
act boldly in that ocean. Germany did not want Japan to enter 
into actual conflict with the United States because such a war 
would soon spread to the Atlantic, But a move against Singapore 
would oblige the United States to focus her attention in the 
Pacific. Hitler shrewdly calculated that the United States 
would have to take the initiative to declare war—a difficult 
_ 
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step for a democracy. Hitler's political strategy worked for 
a time to Germany's benefit but its eventual failure was due 
to Hitler's inability to influence Japan. 
The disappointing results of the Tripartite Pact and 
the failure of Molotov's visit to Berlin prompted Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka to consider a personal trip to Europe. He 
received a formal invitation from Berlin and decided to come 
early in 1941. Matsuoka's journey to Europe with visits in 
Moscow and Berlin had a dual purpose. Matsuoka wanted to learn 
Germany's plans against Great Britain and if relations with 
Russia were still good. While in Moscow, Matsuoka hoped to 
negotiate a non-aggression pact with Russia and to attempt to 
settle the Chinese v;ar. In each case Matsuoka was to make 
no military commitments to either nation with respect to 
participation in the European war. 
Ribbentrop prepared extensively for this important 
visit to Berlin, He would be able for the first time to speak 
directly to Matsuoka in an attempt to persuade him to have 
Japan attack Singapore. It also gave Ribbentrop the opportunity 
to forewarn the Japanese that all was not well between Germany 
and Russia and that Japan should move quickly in the south to 
take advantage of the forthcoming opportunities in the north. 
Ott wired Ribbentrop before the first scheduled conference 
about the possibilities for a Japanese attack on Singapore. 
He concluded that the Japanese were preparing such a venture 
but that the attack hinged upon Japan's freedom of action 
i* 
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6 
without fear from Russia. Weizsaecker prepared a memorandum 
on topics for discussion in Matsuoka's forthcoming conferences 
with Ribbentrop, He concluded that the Japanese government 
should be informed of the impending attack on Russia so as to 
save it much embarrassment and not weaken the bonds of friendship 
7 
between Germany and Japan. 
Matsuoka arrived in Berlin on 26 March with great 
ceremony and spent the next week in a series of high-level 
conferences with the leaders of Germany. Hitler, in the midst 
of the Yugoslavian crisis, considered the visit important 
enough to have two personal discussions with Matsuoka. 
Ribbentrop's first meeting with Matsuoka on 27 March 
was a tedious review of the military situation in Europe and the 
future value of the Tripartite Pact. Relations with Russia 
at the moment 'were correct...but not very friendly'. Germany 
would not pay Russia's price for adherence to the Tripartite 
Pact and her activities in the Balkans were totally unacceptable. 
If Russia assumed a position that threatened Germany, Hitler 
would crush her completely. 
The principle enemy now was not Great Britain. The 
United States must be prevented from taking an active part in 
the war and from rendering effective aid to Great Britain. 
Ribbentrop stated that Hitler believed that Japan should 
decide as soon as possible to take positive action against 
3 
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Great Britain, A sudden attack on Singapore would be a decisive 
factor to help defeat Great Britain and the speed of the 
operation should keep the United States out of the war because 
that country could scarcely risk sending its fleet into 
8 
Japanese waters in the Pacific. 
Hitler met the same day with Matsuoka to reiterate 
the German position in Europe and the unique opportunities 
in the Par East for Japan to satisfy her colonial aspirations. 
The capture of Singapore would be a major step toward the 
9 
establishment of Japan's new order in Asia. Ribbentrop repeated 
Hitler's conversation the next day. He stated that: "Germany 
...had everything she needed...in Europe" but Japan would 
have to seize Singapore in order to establish her dominance. 
On Russia, Ribbentrop stated: 
...that a closer collaboration with Russia was an 
absolute impossibility since the ideological bases of 
the army as well as the rest of the nation were 
completely incompatible. 10 
This was the first definite hint of the impending invasion 
and Matsuoka registered surprise. 
Ribbentrop pressed the issue on Russia in yet another 
conference with Matsuoka. He stated that: "if Russia should 
ever attack Japan, Germany would strike immediately" and gave 
al firm assurance that Japan could move southward towards 
8 
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Singapore without fear of any complications from Russia. 
Ribbentrop cautioned Matsuoka against signing a conclusive 
agreement with Russia but to conduct negotiations on a 
11 
superficial level. Stalin's price for joining the Tripartite 
Pact was too high for Germany to consider and Ribbentrop 
told Matsuoka that the British fleet, involved in the Atlantic 
and in the Mediterranean, could not interfere with a Japanese 
assault on Singapore. 
Matsuoka travelled to Rome to confer with Mussolini 
and the Pope and then returned to Berlin on 4 April. In his 
final conferences with Hitler and Ribbentrop there were few 
things that remained to be said. Hitler stated that he wanted 
to prevent the United States from entering the conflict and had 
taken steps against a possible invasion of Europe. He went 
on to declare that: 
If Japan got into a conflict with the United States, 
Germany on her part would take the necessary steps at 
once... Germany...would promptly take part in case of 
a conflict between Japan and the United States for the 
strengh ..of the Axis in the Three Power Pact lay in their 
acting in common. Their weakness would be allowing 
themselves to be defeated separately. 12 
Matsuoka returned the assurance with the statement that a war 
against the United States appeared unavoidable but made no 
definite promise to Hitler to join Germany if she became 
involved in a conflict with the United States. Matsuoka 
departed from Berlin and journeyed to Moscow, 
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Matsuoka signed a treaty of neutrality With Stalin 
while in Moscow on 1^ April. Matsuoka, from his talks in 
Berlin, realized that Germany did not intend to invade Great 
Britain and that German-Russian relations were not good. 
Therefore Japan would have to depend on her own resources. 
Japan looked south and was anxious for a treaty v/ith Russia to 
safeguard herself in the north. The Russian government attempted 
to negate the possibilities of a two-front war if relations 
with Germany deteriorated any further. The stipulation of 
mutual neutrality in times of war provided Russia with a 
measure of security in the east to meet the imminent crisis 
in the west. 
Hitler regarded the Russo-Japanese neutrality treaty 
with a mixture of perplexity and indifference. At a naval 
conference on 20 April Hitler stated that the agreement had 
15 
been concluded with Germany's approval. But many officals 
in the higher echelons of the German government realized that 
Matsuoka's action in Moscow annoyed Hitler. Riboentrop stated 
that he had not given his approval of such a treaty to Matsuoka 
14 
and the conclusion of the accord was a complete surprise. 
Hitler's basic attitude v/as one of indifference because the 
agreement tended to camouflage his future action against 
Russia. However, Hitler underestimated the value of the 
understanding for Japan. The Japanese government maintained 
_ 
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its independence in foreign policy which would have serious 
repercussions for Germany. 
Japan's independent foreign policy did not take long 
to make itself known when, on 4 May, Matsuoka informed 
Ribbentrop that Japan had begun to negotiate with the United 
States in an effort to mediate the differences between the two 
nations in the Pacific and the recent embargoes upon Japan by 
the United States. The conferences began through regular 
diplomatic channels in early 1941 without the knowledge of 
the German government. 
Ribbentrop v/as furious when he heard the news. Ott 
wired Berlin that influences hostile to the Tripartite Pact 
compelled Matsuoka to yield. In a conversation with him, 
Matsuoka stated that: 
If war should break out between Germany and Russia, no 
Japanese Prime Minister or Foreign Minister would be 
able to keep Japan neutral. In such a case Japan would 
be impelled by natural consideration to join Germany 
in attacking Russia, 15 
Ribbentrop showed Oshima a report of the Japanese-American 
talks and took the position that if Japan should conclude an 
agreement with the United States, it would render the Tripartite 
Pact meaningless, no matter what phraseology might be used 
in an attempt to reconcile the act. Ribbentrop expressed his 
desire that Japan would not sign a non-aggression pact with 
the United States. But Hitler differed with Ribbentrop on 
this point and was ready to see the conversations continue, 
15 
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provided that they served to deter the United States from 
16 
affording assistance to Great Britain. Hitler's pledge to go 
to v/ar against the United States if she attacked Japan was no 
doubt meant to stimulate Tokyo into action against Singapore, 
Germany could give Japan little support except through submarine 
warfare and Hitler concluded that if the Japanese government 
continued to negotiate with the United States, it would relieve 
the pressure on Germany. The German invasion of Russia would 
settle Japan's uneasiness in the north and thereby create a 
I 
much stronger threat to the United States when Japan actively 
intervened in Asia. 
Ribbentrop drafted a strong note to the Japanese 
government. In it he reminded Matsuoka that the Tripartite 
Pact was to ,prevent othei* powers from intervening in the war. 
In order to avoid weakening the agreement, its members should 
not make special agreements outside the pact, or at any rate, 
fail to insure recognition of the critical stipulation of the 
pact. The German government demanded that it be permitted to 
17 
participate fully in the Japanese-American negotiations. This 
burst of temper did not ruffle the Japanese government and 
Matsuoka assured Berlin of Japan's loyalty to the Tripartite 
Pact. Ribbentrop, deeply discontented and confused, still 
i 
felt that Japan would honor her obligations. 
German preparations continued for the invasion of Russia 
TB 
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and still Ribbentrop did not inform Japan of the operation, 
Ott asked Ribbentrop if he could inform Matsuoka about the 
impending invasion to warn the Japanese government and perhaps 
18 
coordinate it with military action by Japan in the Par East. 
Ribbentrop did not wish to contradict Hitler's directive and 
instead speculated that the German attack on Russia might cause 
Japan to halt her advance to the south and join with Hitler 
19 
in dispensing of her traditional enemy Russia. Weizsaecker 
asked Oshima if Matsuoka Understood the true state of affairs 
between Germany and Russia. Oshima replied that he did not 
believe Matsuoka suspected the deep hostility between the two 
and appeared genuinely shocked at the suggestion. There was 
still no German initiative to inform Japan of the impending 
invasion of Russia. 
Matsuoka, unaware of the invasion, explained Japan's 
position in the Par East to Ott on 21 June. He made no secret 
of Japan's intention to seize Indo-China and to capture the 
Dutch East Indies. Japan needed the valuable economic resources 
in those islands, especially oil, Matsuoka requested German 
assistance to get the Vichy government of France to consent 
20 
to Japanese naval bases in Indo-China. Japan appeared to be 
poised by mid-June to diplomatically secure a foothold in 
Indo-China and then aggressively move south against the 
18 
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British Empire. 
Hitler was never so near to complete victory as in 
May and June 1941 because of Germany's success in the Balkans 
and the apparent possibility of closing the Mediterranean to 
Great Britain. He accomplished all this before the United 
States could enter the war and had his ally Japan in the 
Pacific to threaten the United States and delay intervention* 
Hitler now only had the problem of Russia. Here he determined 
to stake everything on a German victory. The conquest of 
Russia would provide Germany with the economic resources for 
the final assault in the west. In Europe, the invasion of 
Russia provided only a temporary respite to Great Britain. 
But in the Par East, it gave the final impetus to Japan's plans 
for expansion that was to lead to v/ar with the United States. 
Hitler presented his ally Japan with a fait accompli 
on 22 June 1941 when the German army invaded Russia. The 
deliberate policy of not informing Japan of the German plans 
resounded with shocking effect in Tokyo. Prime Minister 
Konoye regarded the action as a betrayal of the Tripartite 
Pact and favored an immediate withdrawal from the accord. 
The attack made nonsense of one of the reasons for Japan's 
adherence to the pact—a settlement with Russia. The Japanese 
government concluded that Russia would not be easily defeated 
and that Hitler had involved Germany in a long, exhausting 
war. Such circumstances meant that Japan would nov; face a 
coalition of the United States, Russia and Great Britain. The 
prospect for the expected German defeat of Great Britain 
100 
faded into the background, 
Germany attempted to soothe Japan with a torrent of 
diplomatic notes all designed to calm her ally and to keep her 
within the Tripartite Pact. Ott explained to Matsuoka the 
reasons for the German attack on Russia. Matsuoka in turn 
stated that according to his reports from Berlin, Hitler did 
21 
not expect active participation by Japan against Russia. 
Contrary to this assumption Ribbentrop pushed for immediate 
military action by Japan against Russia in a discussion with 
Oshima. He listed seven reasons for Japanese intervention: 
1. It would provide a direct land connection between the two 
countries; 2. The war would provide a solution to the Russian 
problem; 3,It would make possible a new order in Europe; 4. Japan 
in turn could create her own new order; 5. Rather than drive 
south to Singapore, she could move north and then free her 
rear for the south; 6, A decision should be made without 
hesitation; and 7. A swift defeat of Russia would keep the 
United States out of the war, Ribbentrop instructed Ott to 
use all his influence and these arguments to persuade the 
22 
Japanese to intervene. Another note, written in the excited 
optimism of the first massive German victories, urged Japan 
to intervene quickly because Russian military resistance 
23 
might collapse sooner than expected. 
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The Japanese government listened to these bombastic 
overtures to war with strong restraint and a growing distrust 
of Germany, Japan could not be lured into a war with the 
promises of a quick victory over Russia. Matsuoka informed the 
Russian ambassador in early July that Japan would honor fully 
her neutrality agreement with Russia. The course of German-
Japanese relations continued to run true to past form: each 
party attempting to exploit the other and consulting the other 
only when in its own interest. 
CHAPTER VII 
DECISION TO DEFEAT JUNE 1941-DECEMBER 1941 
Germany's relations with Japan after the invasion of 
Russia in June 1941 underwent a reversal of policy, appearing 
inconsistent to the Japanese government, Ribbentrop's arguments 
that Russia had been defeated and then his request for Japanese 
assistance against Russia seemed surprising at such an early 
date in the war. The Japanese asked themselves, if the German 
government wanted to benefit from Japan's cooperation, why did 
Hitler refuse to inform Japan properly and fail to plan joint 
strategy in advance? No doubt suspicion, and the desire for 
secrecy and surprise were part of the answer and also Hitler's 
confidence in Germany's capacity to defeat Russia alone. German 
diplomats advised Japan to occupy Singapore but when the 
Japanese government did not drive south and instead began to 
negotiate with the United States, Hitler considered intervention 
by Japan in the war against Russia as the best alternative. 
Ribbentrop sent a strong note to the Japanese government 
on 1 July urging it to intervene in the war to seize Vladivostok 
and to advance west so that the defeat of Russia would free 
both Europe and the Par East from her menace: 
The impending collapse of the Russians' main military power 
and thereby presumably of the Bolshevist regime itself, 
offers Japan the unique opportunity to free herself also 
from the Russian threat and give the Japanese empire the 
security in the north which is a necessary condition 
for its vitally important expansion in the south. It 
therefore seems to me that the need of the hour is for the 
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Japanese army to seize Vladivostok as soon as possible 
and...meet the German troops advancing to the east halfway 
...before the cold season sets in...and finally to have 
the whole Russian question settled,..jointly in such a 
way as to eliminate for all time the Russian threat 
to both Germany and Japan. 1 
Ribbentrop went on to state that the defeat of Russia would; 
"suffice to paralyze any tendency toward intervention in the 
war (by) the United States (and) hasten the defeat of England 
2 
by the Axis powers." Ribbentrop with his faulty logic believed 
that Japan's intervention would solve all of Germany's world 
problems. What he failed to see was that German influence 
in Tokyo fell far short of such a task. Ribbentrop not only 
overestimated German influence in Japanese affairs but he also 
miscalculated Japan's military strength. Hitler recognized 
the Japanese puppet regime in China as the legitimate government 
3 
of China in an attempt, to obtain Japan's military support. 
All these major policy changes came within the space of ten 
days for German foreign policy. 
The sudden shift in German foreign policy confused the 
Japanese government and necessitated a change in its policies. 
Japan did not have sufficient troops available for simultaneous 
assaults against Vladivostok and Singapore and the Japanese 
army feared the strong Russian forces in the north. The army 
had high hopes that Germany soon would crush Russia and then 
Japan would have no need to go to war. Matsuoka alone advocated 
1 
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an offensive against Russia for political, ideological and 
strategic reasons but the military leaders still favored a 
4 
southward advance based on the hard facts of economic necessity, 
Ott reported from Tokyo that Matsuoka stated that 
Japan was not at present in a position to enter the war against 
5 
Russia but was preparing for all eventual possibilities. The 
Japanese government instead decided to secure points'appui in 
French Indo-China in order to increase its pressure on Great 
Britain and the United States. Japan reasoned that such a 
contribution to the common cause would be no less important 
6 
than Japanese intervention against Russia. Ribbentrop certainly 
misjudged Japan's intentions when he believed that she would 
attack Russia. The Japanese-American conversations presented 
a more disconcerting problem to the German government. 
Ribbentrop distrusted Japan's motives for the talks 
and this apprehension grew when the United States occupied 
Iceland on 10 July. He asked Ott for more details on the 
Japanese-American negotiations and the possibility of an oral 
accord between the two countries. Ribbentrop doubted if the 
United States occupied Iceland without Japan's consent. He also 
cast serious aspersions on the report of a deadlock in the 
7 
negotiations between Japan and the United States. Ott reported 
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strained relations between the two countries because of the 
United States economic blockade. The Japanese government 
regarded an United States entry into the war with great 
anxiety. Ott tried his upmost to have Japan declare 
8 
war against Russia. 
Hitler had a talk with Oshima at his field headquarters 
in the east on 15 July. He spoke at length on the campaign 
9 
against Russia and urged that Japan join to annihilate Russia. 
Germany's efforts suffered a severe setback when on 16 July 
the Konoye government resigned and Germany lost its strongest 
supporter in that government, Foreign Minister Matsuoka. 
i The new Japanese government implied no change in 
Japan's policy toward Russia and promised to uphold the 
10 
Tripartite Pact. Ott expressed the opinion that the new 
government would not pursue a vigorous policy against the 
11 
United States, or Russia, But the German government deluded 
itself to the point where it believed that Japan's entry into 
the Russian v/ar to be only a matter of time, Ribbentrop 
continued his efforts to convince Japan to cease negotiations 
with the United States, The embargo by the United States on 
aviation gas and oil to Japan placed the Japanese government 
8 
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in a great dilemma and generated greater misgivings in Japan 
12 
about an^early v/ar with Russia, These reports still did not 
convince the German Foreign Office that Japan had no interest 
in a war against Russia, 
Hitler's thought Japan's intervention imminent and in 
a naval conference on 22 August stated: "Japan would carry-
out the attack on Vladivostok as soon as forces have been 
13 
assembled,..and the attack is to come as a surprise move." 
Hitler's prediction conflicted with a report two days later 
from the German naval attach/ in Tokyo. He stated that, based 
on conversations with leading Japanese naval officers on 
22 August, there would be no attack on Russia. Japan instead, 
after consolidating her bases in Indo-China, would occupy 
Thailand and- the Dutch oil fields, attack Manilla and blockade 
14 
Singapore. Ribbentrop responded to this news with a hysterical 
telegram in which he called Japan's attitude incomprehensible 
and outlined several arguments with which Ott was to counter 
15 
the irresolution of the new Japanese government, 
Japan continued to follow her own independent course 
in foreign policy, antagonizing Germany and creating a serious 
breach in the German-Japanese alliance. The Japanese Prime 
12 
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Minister suggested a personal conference with the President 
of the United States to discuss the difficulties between the 
16 
two nations, Ott asked if there was a change in Japan's 
policy but the Japanese Foreign Office informed him that this 
was not the case, Japan was still loyal to the Tripartite 
17 
Pact and would assume no commitment contrary to the pact. 
These serious divergences in the alliance forced Germany to 
make a renewed attempt to bring Japan closer to her side. 
Ribbentrop directed Ott to urge that Japan inform the United 
States that further acts of aggression would invoke the 
casus belli in the Tripartite Pact and that she would exercise 
18 
caution in dealing with the United States. 
The Japanese government assured Germany on 16 September 
that Japan would come to the aid of the Axis in case of an 
attack by the United States on them and repeated that Japan 
in accordance with the Tripartite Pact had fullfilled her 
19 
task of restraining the United States from entering the v/ar. 
Ott considered such statements to be far from precise and 
unimpressive. But regardless of Germany's objections, Japan 
continued to negotiate with the United States. The negotiations 
did not solve the problems and as the month of September drew 
16 
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to a close, the chances for peace or war began to gravitate 
toward the latter. 
i 
Germany had its first intimation of this nev/ course 
tov/ard war in a report from Ott of Japan's position as sketched 
by high officers of the Japanese army. The generals preferred 
an attack in the south against the British Empire which would 
not be dependent on weather as would operations against Russia, 
Great Britain was the immediate enemy but there was a growing 
20 
feeling that war with the United States was inevitable. The 
German Foreign Office emphasized its dissatisfaction with 
strong denunciations to Oshima of the continued negotiations 
with the United States, At the same time it was also aware 
that these negotiations were fast approaching a complete 
deadlock. The Japanese government fell on 16 October and a 
21 
new government under General Hedeki Tojo assumed power. The 
choice of the general was not illogical in view of the army's 
determination to attack the United States should negotiations 
fail. The German government did not consider the consequences 
of a failure in the talks, a costly mistake. 
The advent of the Tojo government in October 1941 
actually worried Hitler. He feared that Japan might declare 
war against Russia and so be in Germany's way were Russia 
suddenly to collapse, as she appeared to be doing at this 
22 
stage of the invasion. However this was not the case as the 
20 
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Tojo government showed a decided lack of enthusiasm for 
intervention, Ott confirmed this position in a talk with 
the new Foreign Minister Togo. He stated that there was no 
decision yet about the United States or Russia and that foreign 
23 
policy was still uncertain. To30 was much more hostile to the 
United States than his immediate predecessor and Ott learned 
that there were definite limits on Japan's conversations with 
24 
the United States beyond which she would not go. 
Japanese-American relations deteriorated rapidly through 
I 
November and Japan approached the decision on war. The German 
government, not fully cognizant of this course, continued to 
be vociferous in its call for an end to the negotiations. The 
two nations renewed the original 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact with 
one important modification: the abolition of the secret protocol 
between Germany and Japan. The German-Russian war, the 
Japanese-Russian neutrality treaty and the Tripartite Pact 
made this change a logical one. 
The Japanese government faced a serious crisis with the 
possibility of a Japanese-American war becoming more definite 
and the question: would Germany prove faithful to its promises? 
A strict interpretation of the Tripartite Pact made no provision 
for assistance if Japan initiated an attack. There was 
considerable doubt in the Japanese government and a fear that 
Germany might conclude a separate peace. At an Imperial 
23 
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Conference on 5 November, the Japanese government formulated 
its policy. Japan decided to inform Germany and Italy without 
delay of her intention to initiate hostilities when 
negotiations with thé United States deadlocked and war became 
irreconcilable, as was expected after 25 November. In the 
spirit of the Tripartite Pact, Japan would begin conversations 
with her Axis partners for their entry into the war and the 
conclusion of a "no separate peace" agreement, Japan intended 
to refuse a German demand to enter the war against Russia, 
25 
even it meant a delay in German participation, 
A member of the Japanese General Staff approached 
the German military attache in Tokyo on 20 November and asked 
whether Germany would support Japan with military forces should 
a conflict arise between Japan and the United States. Ott 
passed the question on to Ribbentrop in Berlin. Ribbentrop 
replied that Germany considered it a matter of policy that 
in case either Germany or Japan became involved in a war with 
the United States, they would conclude a peace or armistice 
jointly and that Germany: "would be entirely inclined to lay 
26 
down the necessary stipulations in an agreement..." The 
Japanese government, highly gratified with Germany's response, 
pressed the matter further. The Japanese Minister of War 
asked Ott if Germany would also consider herself at war with 
25 
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the United States if Japan should open hostilities against 
27 
the latter. The German Foreign Office made no reply to this 
request for a direct commitment. 
Ribbentrop met with Oshima on 28 November to discuss 
Japanese-American relations. Ribbentrop commented that he 
did not believe that Japan could avoid a showdown with the 
United States and that the situation hardly could be more 
favorable for a war now. A war would realize the full potential 
of the Tripartite Pact. Germany would join with Japan at once 
and sign a "no separate peace" agreement. Ribbentrop stated 
at the end of the conversation: 
Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United 
States, Germany of course v/ould join the war immediately. 
There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering 
into a separate peace with the United States under such 
circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point. 28 
Japan did not want to attack Russia too, but at this stage 
any Japanese expansion of the war was welcome to the German 
government. Germany had no suspicions that Japan intended to 
attack the United States, Hitler believed that Japan would 
attack the British and the Dutch possessions in the Par East, 
exactly what he wanted Japan to do. He felt that a pledge to 
support Japan if the United States was to intervene would give 
her the courage to strike. If Hitler had knov/n in advance what 
Japan was going to do, he might have avoided giving his 
27 
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"blank check" of support. But at this date Hitler believed 
that he had decisively beaten Russia. 
Japan made the final decision to attack the United 
States on 1 December and immediately set in motion diplomatic 
efforts to secure the participation of the Axis in the coming 
war with a special agreement. Tojo instructed Oshima to tell 
Hitler and Ribbentrop that Great Britain and the United States, 
in a provocative manner, made military movements that Japan, 
for her security, could not tolerate. Oshima was to say very 
secretly to them that there was extreme danger that war suddenly 
might break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan 
through some clash of arms and to add that the time of the 
29 
outbreak of the war might come sooner than anyone dreamed. 
Germany's response appeared to be in some doubt and 
Ribbentrop was extremely cautious. He replied to Oshima's 
request for an agreement with much hestitancy, pointing out 
that Germany was being asked to make an extremely grave decision 
without adequate information. Ribbentrop considered that 
Germany was not obligated to assist Japan in case she attacked 
the United States but Hitler dismissed these considerations 
50 
as unimportant. On 5 December Ribbentrop told Oshima that 
Hitler accepted Japan's request and also gave him a draft of 
the proposed treaty. The draft provided that should a state 
of war arise between Japan and the United States, Germany and 
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Italy would also enter the war and wage it v/ith all the armed 
forces at their disposal. Japan would do the same should war 
break ouf between the Axis and the United States. The three 
powers would not conclude peace without full previous agreement 
among themselves with the same stipulation applying in event 
of war between Japan and Great Britain. The agreement was to 
51 
have the same duration as the Tripartite Pact of 1940, The 
draft showed that Germany had no idea that war between Japan 
and the United States v/as imminent. To jo warned Oshima that 
war might come before the agreement could be signed and he 
32 
considered a simple "no separate peace" accord to be the best. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 
stunned the German government. No one suspected the attack. 
Ribbentrop later said; 
I tried to induce Japan, at the time, to attack Singapore. 
I also tried to make Japan attack Russia. She did neither 
of the things we v/anted her to do, but instead., .she 
attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, 55 
Ribbentrop, after hearing the news of the attack, questioned 
Oshima and told him that Germany and Italy would immediately 
support Japan. The attack on Pearl Harbor also made the 
54 
draft treaty obsolete. Hitler, despite his earlier desire to 
avoid a conflict with the United States, was not only surprised 
but delighted by Japan's successful intervention. Hitler 
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considered Japan's entry into the war among the most decisive 
35 
events in modern history. Japan's action provided psychological 
support for the German army which was just then undergoing 
serious reverses on the Russian front. On 5 December Ott 
i 
warned the Japanese government against attacking the United 
36 
States outright. But he received a sharp directive from Berlin 
to correct this wrong impression^ So long as Japan joined 
37 
the war the form was not important anymore, cabled Ribbentrop. 
This attitude was not surprising. Since September Germany 
had, for all intents and purposes been at war with the United 
States in the Atlantic, 
A day after Pearl Harbor, Oshima submitted a formal 
request that Germany declare war on the United States. 
Ribbentrop told him that Hitler already had given orders to the 
German navy to attack United States shipping. He was in 
conference with his staff at General Headquarters to decide 
how a formal declaration of war could be v/ritten so as to 
38 
make a good impression on the German people. Many thought 
that Hitler would avoid the request because of the previous 
shrewd policy of avoiding incidents in the Atlantic. But this 
approach was nov; impossible. Hitler's stand in the Atlantic 
35 
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was no longer practical since the United States now escorted 
convoys with orders to shoot on sight from President Roosevelt. 
If the Germans avoided an outright declaration of war, the 
United States' focus of attention would shift to the Pacific 
and allow Germany much needed respite. However, clever 
diplomacy found itself pitted against totalitarian arrogance 
and Hitler's prestige. The logic of the situation did not 
39 
allow Hitler to renege on his pledge. Ribbentrop drafted a 
revised tripartite agreement providing that the Axis would 
fight until victory was secured, that they would make no 
separate armistice or peace without full agreement of each 
partner and that, after the v;ar, they would collaborate closely 
40 
in the establishment of an equitable new order. 
Hitler, speaking in his most vituperative fashion 
before the Reichstag, declared war on the United States on 
11 December 1941. He revealed in his speech that a political 
accord, signed that day also by the Axis and Japan, meant war 
against Great Britain and the United States but significantly 
I 
omitted Russia. Germany and Japan now united in a brotherhood 
of arms for the logical climax of their coalition. Hitler's 
declaration of war relieved Roosevelt of the problem of being 
openly at war with Japan but still not formally at war 
with Germany and Italy. ^ 
Germany's relations with Japan after Pearl Harbor 
became a mirage in international relations. Henceforth strategy 
39 
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rather than diplomacy would govern their relations but for 
the rest of the war, common planning was conspicuous by its 
-
absence and the various military agreements only so much 
paper. The vast geographical distance between Germany and 
Japan and the difficulties in communications contributed to 
this situation. But the peculiar nature of the totalitarian 
' regimes of Germany and Japan did not allow any collaboration 
as neither ally could or would provide military assistance 
for the other. Under these circumstances, Hitler's declaration 
of war was as great a blunder as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, 
I I 
The efficacy of the Tripartite Pact hinged on the 
fact that neither Germany nor Japan proved willing to make 
sacrifices for the sake of the alliance, a point inherent 
in this opportunistic association. Their mutual efforts were 
against the status quo and the destruction of the established 
order. In the Tripartite Pact, each ally established the 
territorial domain of its new order and warned others against 
interference. Therefore, if one ally considered its aims 
to be realized it cared little for the other. This was why 
Hitler had no use for the Japanese after the fall of Prance 
and why in 1942 Japan showed little concern about Germany. 
Two more factors, distrust and the mutual desire to 
draw an advantage from the other, characterized the Tripartite 
Pact. The events of 22 June and 7 December demonstrated the 
suspicion harbored by Germany and Japan toward each other, an 
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attitude so distrustful that each preferred to forego mutual 
strategy for the sake of secrecy. Both allies showed great 
propensity for wishing the other to carry the burden of the 
war. Germany wanted Japan to assault Singapore and later 
Vladivostok as an effective contribution to the war, Japan 
did not have the slightest intention of doing those things 
unless Germany staged a successful invasion of Great Britain 
or Russia collapsed politically. Hitler could not imagine that 
this would be Japan's attitude. 
Germany and Japan professed a single aim on the question 
of the United States but again, they could not coordinate 
their policies. Both wanted to keep the United States out 
of the European and the Far Eastern struggles but this policy 
failed when the United States refused to be intimidated by the 
Tripartite Pact. Hitler evolved a new approach to divert 
United States* attention to the Pacific. He ordered the German 
navy to avoid all incidents in the Atlantic and meanwhile, 
urged the Japanese government to attack Singapore and to 
assume a forceful attitude toward the United States. Hitler 
believed that if the United States became involved in the 
Par East, she would be less inclined to interfere in Europe 
or render assistance to Great Britain. But this attempt to 
use Japan failed because German influence in Tokyo was strictly 
limited. Japan, after the first failures of the Tripartite 
Pact, decided to reshape her policy toward the United States. 
If the pact could not keep the United States out of the war, 
perhaps diplomatic negotiations with her would be able to solve 
118 
Japan's problemso Certainly Japan was neither capable nor 
willing to conduct the dangerous policy of constantly inciting 
the United States as Hitler wanted Japan to do. 
Hitler faced a serious dilemma when Japan began to 
negotiate with the United States. He staunchly opposed the 
negotiations because they offered the United States immediate 
relief in the Pacific. As a consequence, the United States 
could assume a more militant belligerency in the Atlantic. 
A Japanese accord with the United States would mean Japan's 
worth as an ally to be nil. Therefore the only alternative 
lay in the failure of the negotiations. But this in turn 
might initiate a war between Japan and the United States, which 
Hitler had better approve if he did not wish to lose Japan 
altogether, , The war v/ould spread to the Atlantic, and to 
prefer it to an agreement would indicate to the Japanese 
government how insincere Hitler was in his desire to prevent 
United States' intervention. There was a conflict between 
Hitler's Atlantic and Pacific policies—a conflict which 
eventually tended to blur his thinking. In his anxiety to 
retain Japanese support, Hitler became less cautious and urged 
Japan to follow a more belligerent line toward the United 
States. The United States policy in the Atlantic after 
September 1941 with the sink on sight orders placed Germany 
and the United States at war for all practical purposes and 
strengthened Hitler's tendency to take chances. Germany's 
policy toward the United States experienced a complete reversal 
within a year from cautious neutrality to outright belligerency 
and war. 
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Japan viewed her role in the Tripartite Pact quite 
differently. When Germany wanted Japan to attack Singapore, 
the Japanese government expressed fear of Russia and the United 
States. Japan pleaded prior commitments in southeast Asia 
when Germany urged her to take Vladivostok, The Japanese 
wanted to establish their "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere" and neither Hitler nor Ribbentrop could divert them 
from their course. Japan wanted to acquire the European 
colonies in Asia and even hoped to settle her disputes with 
the United States, ^^en this proved impossible the Japanese 
government decided to proceed with its expansionist policies 
at the risk of war with the United States. Ribbentrop tried 
his utmost to involve Japan but he exercised little influence 
and understood less about Japan's plans, Germany's part in 
the Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was extremely small 
and directly, Germany bore no responsibility, Japan made 
her decision without any consideration of Germany's interests. 
In fact, the Japanese decision to move south relieved Russia 
on her eastern border and allowed her to move a quarter of a 
million troops west to strengthen the defense of Moscow, 
eventually halting the German offensive in December 1941. 
During the rest of the war military cooperation of every kind 
was lacking and each nation went its ovm way. The value of 
the Tripartite Pact was reduced to the paper it was written on. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The German declaration of war against the United States 
was a high point in the German-Japanese entente and also 
marked the beginning of its decline. The political association 
whose principle purpose had been to cause unrest and create 
discord among the major world powers would henceforth be the 
subject of massive attack until its destruction. While the 
Allies sought to coordinate their strategy, no real collaboration 
existed between Germany and Japan. They did conclude a 
military agreement in January 1942 whose provisions seemed 
rather to delimit the areas of combat for each nation than to 
prescribe joint action. After having established their private 
spheres of influence, neither Germany nor Japan could see the 
necessity to aid one another in defense of their interests. 
Hitler assumed complete control in directing the war in 1942 
and it was inconceivable that he would be willing to plan 
a joint military campaign. He might persuade the Japanese 
government to attack Singapore because it was in Germany's 
interest but Hitler proved unwilling to reveal his plans 
on Russia in order to profit from possible Japanese collaboration. 
The enormous distance between Germany and Japan 
seriously hampered collective action along with adequate 
communications. All regular land and sea routes closed to 
Germany after the attacks on Russia and Pearl Harbor. The only 
120 
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opportunity for political contacts was the radio but this 
was limited. Germany's use of blockade runners, auxiliary 
cruisers 'and submarines to escape Allied control of the sea 
was none too successful. Germany could neither deliver military 
equipment to Japan nor obtain vital raw materials from the 
Japanese Empire because of the difficulties in commercial 
intercourse during the war. 
In an area where Germany and Japan would really have 
been able to coordinate their strategy—the Russian theatre—the 
two faced different circumstances inasmuch as Japan was not 
at war v/ith Russia. Japan attempted to negotiate a German-
Russian reconciliation with proposals for a mediated peace 
after 1941. Japan argued that Germany faced disaster in the 
struggle with Russia. Hitler would not listen to such pleas 
and wanted to destroy Russia, especially after his first 
military defeats. Japan had little inclination to join in 
the war against Russia and this position only provided additional 
difficulties for the none too stable coalition. 
The coalition between Germany and Japan was one of 
negative attitudes rather than positive formulas. Germany's 
reaction to Japan's successes after Pearl Harbor was a renewed 
fear of the "Yellow Peril" with the fear that all of Asia 
1 
might be lost to the yellow race. The "have-not" states, 
Germany and Japan, in their quick assent to great power status, 
wanted to create nev; orders to receive a better share of the 
world's wealth. Germany and Japan fought on separate fronts 
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with the same objective but did not cooperate in military 
strategy. The aggressive nature of the association offered 
strategic opportunities to each member at different times. 
Japan used these opportunities advantageously threatening the 
European colonies. In times of peace, this coalition held a 
distinct advantage over its opponents and extended the political 
influence of Germany tremendously. The relationship was not 
a perfect one v/hen Japan for instance, chose to destroy the 
German commercial position in China and Germany was unable 
to prevent it. 
The strength of Berlin and Tokyo in peace became its 
wealmess during the war. The Axis partners, widely separately, 
could not cooperate effectively in any military efforts with 
their forces stretched all over their respective spheres. The 
Japanese connection then started to operate against Germany's 
interests. Germany, being the more powerful of the two nations, 
represented a greater danger and because of this, the Allied 
strategists decided to defeat Germany first while holding 
Japan in check. When the United States entered the war, Germany 
and Japan were already so deeply engaged that they were 
incapable or unwilling to assist each other. The German-
Japanese alliance had split of its ovm. accord. 
Germany's foreign policy toward Japan had sound political 
considerations but the German Foreign Office could never 
quite achieve the definite commitment to make the alliance 
effective. The Anti-Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Pact 
fell short of the concrete military obligations that Germany 
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so desperately needed to carry out her international policy 
of territorial expansion. Without firm commitments, Germany 
could get Japan to do little with effective military assistance 
and when Japan did act, the blow fell on the wrong adversary. 
German diplomacy under Ribbentrop's direction was simply 
not strong enough to bring Japan to terms. Hitler and Ribbentrop 
misunderstood Japan's ovm political considerations in the 
Far East and could not or would not comprehend that Japanese 
foreign policy was motivated by causes different from 
Germany's interests. 
Germany's decision to settle for less in the way of 
military obligations from Japan provided no basis for Axis 
solidarity, collaboration and strategy. Germany struck some 
bad bargains with Japan because those in charge could not see 
beyond Germany's own self-interests. The alliance in peace 
was successful but to rely upon the good faith of the Japanese 
government to act in concert with Germany was a costly mistake. 
Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan were not a complete 
failure. Germany did manage to accomplish some significant 
successes to meet German peacetime needs. But Germany failed 
to achieve a definite military alliance with Japan and this 
failure enabled the Allies to accomplish their global strategy 
and defeat Germany. 

APPENDIX A 
THE GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST 
THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL 1 
I 
The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese 
Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist 
International kno\m as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and 
subdue existing States by all means at its command; convinced 
that the toleration of interference by the Communist International 
in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers 
their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a 
menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the 
defence against Communist subversion; have agreed as follows 
Article I 
The High Contracting Parties agree to inform one another of 
the activities of the Communist International, to consult with 
one another on the necessary preventive measures and to carry 
these through in close collaboration. 
Article II 
The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States 
whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities 
of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the 
spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement. 
Article III 
The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement 
is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the 
day of the signature and shall remain in force for a period of 
five years. Before the expiry of this period the High 
Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the 
further methods of their cooperation. 
In witness whereof, 
Berlin, November 25, 1936 
vonRibbentrop 
Kushakoji 
1 
Documents on International Affairs, 1936 (London; Oxford 
University Press, 1937), pp. 297-299» 
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II 
SUPPLMMTARY PROTOCOL 
On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against 
the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries 
have agreed as follows: 
A) The competent authories of the two High Contracting 
States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning 
the exchange of information over the activities of the Communist 
International as well as investigatory and defensive measures 
against the Communist International. 
B) The competent authories of the two High Contracting 
States will within the framework of the existing laws take 
severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged 
directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist 
International or promote its subversive activities. 
C) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent 
authorities provided for in paragraph (A) a permanent committee 
will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures 
necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities 
of the Communist International will be considered and discussed. 
III 
TEXT OP THE SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 
GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 1 
The Government of the Third Reich and the Imperial Japanese 
Government, recognizing that the Government of the U.S.S.R. 
is working toward a realization of the aims of the Communist 
International and intends to employ its army for this purpose; 
convinced that this fact threatens not only the existence of 
the High Contracting States, but endangers world peace most 
seriously; in order to safeguard their common interests have 
agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Should one of the High Contracting States become the object 
of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the U.S.S.R., 
the other High Contracting States obligates itself to take no 
measures which would tend to ease the situation of the U.S.S.R. 
Should the case described in paragraph I occur, the High 
Contracting States will immediately consult on what measures 
to take to safeguard their common interests. 
Article II 
For the duration of the present agreement the High Contracting 
States will conclude no political treaties with the U.S.S.R. 
1 
Documents on International Affairs. 1939-1A46 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1951), vol. 1, pp. 4-5. 
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contrary to the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent. 
Article III 
The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement 
is to be deemed the original text. The agreement comes into 
force simultaneously with the agreement against the Communist 
International signed today and will remain in force for the 
same period. 
In witness whereof, 
Berlin, November 25, 1936. 
vonRibbentrop 
Mushakoji 
APPENDIX B 
THE THREE-POWER PACT BETWEEN GERMANY, 
ITALY AND JAPAN 1 
The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it the 
prequisite of a lasting peace that every nation in the world 
shall receive the space which it is entitled. They have, 
therefore decided to stand by and cooperate with one another 
in their efforts in Greater Asia and the regions of Europe 
respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose to 
establish and maintain a nev; order of things, calculated to 
promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples 
concerned. 
It is, furthermore, the desire of the three governments 
to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres of the world 
who are inclined to direct their efforts along lines similar 
to their own for the purpose of realizing their ultimate 
object, world peace. 
Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and 
Japan have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and 
Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe. 
Article II 
Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of 
Japan in the establishment of a nev/ order in Greater East Asia. 
Article III 
Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts 
on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one 
another with all political, economic and military means if one 
of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at 
present not involved in the European War or in the Chinese-
Japanese conflict. 
Article IV 
With the view of implementing the present pact, joint technical 
commissions, to be appointed by the respective Governments 
of Germany, Italy and Japan, will meet without delay. 
Article V 
Germany, Italy and Japan affirm that the above agreement 
I 
Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1940-1941 (Boston: 
World Peace Foundation, 1941;, pp. 304-305. 
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affects in no way the political status existing at present 
between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia. 
Article VI * I 
The present pact shall become valid immediately upon signature 
and shall remain in force ten years from the date on which 
it becomes effective. In due time, before the expiration of 
the said term, the High Contracting Parties shall, at the 
request of any of them enter into negotiations for its renewal. 
In recognition thereof, 
Berlin, the 27th of September, 1940 
Ribbentrop 
Oiano 
Kurusu 
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The first sources for study, research and documentation 
of Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan are those specific 
documents and related materials concerned with the Nazi regime 
in the period from 1933 to 1945. The two series of Documents 
On German Foreign Policy provide most of the research source 
material for the thesis. Nearly all of the correspondence 
from Germany to Japan in the period from 1933 to 1941 has been 
collected and organized in these volumes. This collection of 
documents was the most single important source in the study. 
The Fuehrer Conferences on matters dealing with the German Navy 
provides another view of Hitler's opinion on the diplomatic 
relations between the two countries and his strategy in the 
critical years of 1940 and 1941. 
The international war crimes trials conducted in the 
immediate post-war period allowed those men associated with the 
events in the period 1933 to 1945 to explain their actions to 
the world. The documents used in evidence and the record of the 
trial proceedings for Germany and Japan have been collected in 
three major sources: Trial of the Manor War Criminals, Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression, and International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East. These records contained some of the most 
important diplomatic notes and the testimony of the major 
participants in the diplomatic intercourse between Germany 
and Japan from 1933 to 1941. 
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Those documentary sources available for Japan were 
extremely limited but the Congressional Hearings on the event 
and the subsequent publication of Pearl Harbor Attack v/as the 
most valuable documentary source for the Japanese diplomatic 
I 
correspondence. Pearl Harbor Attack proved especially valuable 
for the crucial year of 1941. • * 
The documents and related materials collected by the 
United States Department of State serve as useful reference tools 
for United States correspondence and its position dipomatically 
on the relations between Germany and Japan, These sources 
were : Documents on American Foreign Relations, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1938-1941, and Foreign Relations 
of the United States-Japan 1931-1941. Nazi-Soviet Relations 
focuses on the relations between Russia and Germany and this 
influence in Germany's diplomacy with Japan. The Report of the 
Seventh World Congress of the Communist International and 
Documents on International Affairs were cited to corroborate 
various speeches made by key figures in the period, 
A number of biographies, autobiographies, diaries and 
memoirs have been written by or about the most important men 
in the period from 1933 to 1945. Many of these works were 
useful in the thesis but some lacked a degree of objectivity. 
These apologetic volumes, mostly German, must be read with an 
eye to other sources, the documents being the final arbitrator. 
Memoirs, by Ernest Weizsaecker, the former State 
Secretary under Ribbentrop, is a cautious presentation of 
Weizsaecker's role in the Nazi government. He has several 
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excellent portraits of Hitler but he minimizes his statements 
while in office under the guise of generalizations and shifting 
circumstances. Herbert von Dirksen's, Moscow Tokyo London, is 
a more critical appraisal of Germany's foreign policy in the 
years from 1933 to 1941 and Germany's position in the Sino-
Japanese war, Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, is another 
useful source for firsthand descriptions of important diplomatic 
events in the period through the eyes of Hitler's chief 
Interpreter. Geyr von Schv^eppenburg was Germany's military 
representative to Great Britain in the late 1930's and served 
under Ribbentrop when he v/as ambassador to that country. His 
book, The Critical Years, is a good account of the period and 
Germany's attitude toward Great Britain, 
Alan Bullock's Hitler-A Study in Tyranny is the premier 
* 
work for any research on Hitler and the Nazi regime from 1933 
to 1945, It is a book that should be read first to understand 
the man behind Germany's foreign policy in the period. This 
Man Ribbentrop by Paul Schwarz is useful for early background 
material on Ribbentrop but is of little value for anything about 
the man after 1933. Haider's Private War Journals contains 
only a few references to Germany's policy toward Japan, 
Another view of Nazi Germany in the years from 1933 to 
1941 is provided by two diaries: Ambassador Dodd's Diary 1933 
to 1938 and William Shirer's Berlin Diary. Ambassador Dodd was 
the United States ambassador to Germany and provided some 
interesting but not always accurate assessments of Hitler's 
foreign policy. Shirer is more perceptive and grasps the portent 
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of various diplomatic events. The Ciano Diaries and Ciano's 
Diplomatic Papers are the materials left by the Italian 
Foreign Minister and successfully cover Italy's association 
with Japan through the influence of Germany in the tv/o agreements 
"to which all three powers were a party. 
There have been a number of recent publications on the 
important figures of Japan in this period under research. 
Mosley's study of Hirohito, the Japanese emperor, is an excellent 
presentation of the man, and is extremely valuable. To.jo-The 
Last Banzai by Courtney Brown is a biographical study of Japan's 
wartime leader and his conduct of Japan's government. Shigenori 
Togo, the Japanese Foreign Minister under Tojo, in his book. 
The Cause of Japan, presents an excellent case for Japan's 
position in the Par East and the pressures that led the country 
to attack the United States. 
Two views of Japan by foreign ambassadors are: Joseph 
Grew, Ten Years in Japan, and Sir Robert Craigie, Behind the 
Japanese Mask. Grew's work is more important because of the 
significence of the United States possession of the Japanese 
diplomatic code in the late months before the outbreak of 
war in 1941. 
The large number of general works and momographs 
available to supplement the documentary evidence and to aid in 
the research helped to place the events in the proper perspective 
for the years of decision. J.W. Gantenbein's Documentary 
Background of World War II brings together the most important 
documents concerning the outbreak of the war. The Survey of 
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International Affairs by Arnold Toynbee and others is a year-
by-year description of events throughout the world and was a 
valuable'source for world reaction to German-Japanese relations. 
Frank Chamber's This Age of Conflict is perhaps the best 
single source for a comprehensive view of world events in the 
period from 1933 to 1945. The Origins of the Second World War 
by A.J.P. Taylor is a controversial book whose importance is 
the controversy that Taylor raises in his thesis on the real 
responsibility for the causes of the war. 
The Rome-Berlin Axis by Elizabeth Wiskemann is an 
excellent study of the diplomatic and political relations 
between Germany and Italy. It has some good information on 
Italy's position in the tripartite alliance system. Langer 
and Gleason's The Undeclared War 1940-1941 is probably the 
finest single study of Germany's policy in this period and her 
diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia and Japan, 
This source should be read by anyone doing research in this 
time span. Another study on the same material but not quite 
as good is Trefousse's, German and American Neutrality 1939-1941. 
Beloff's The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia 1939-1941 presents 
I 
a good picture of the position of the Russian government in 
the affairs of Germany and Japan. This book made it possible 
to understand the implications of Germany's foreign policy 
on other states. 
There are a number of fine monographs which provided 
limited information because their main intent dealt with other 
subjects. Churchill's volume, Their Finest Hour, of his series 
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on World War II contained a few significant reflections on 
Germany's foreign policy with Japan, The Sword and Swastika 
by Telford Taylor is one of the best voiumes on the v;ar, fully 
researched and documented, and whose text has some interesting 
comments by leading German generals on the world situation 
with Japan, The Speeches of Adolf Hitler 1933-1939 is an 
exceptional collection of Hitler's major speeches from which 
I quoted extensively for my text. 
Two books; Ikle's German-Japanese Relations 1936-1940 
and Schroeder's The Axis Alliance and Japanese—American 
Relations cover the same material in a rather general inclusive 
manner. Ikle uses Japanese documents extensively but his 
work is rather shallow. Germany and Japan by Presseisen is 
an excellent presentation of the diplomacy between the two 
totalitarian states. The three volumes by or associated 
with Hitler; Mein Kampf. My New Order and Hitler's Secret 
Conversations provide background material for the research 
and help to understand the character of the leader of Germany, 
The World of General Haushofer by Dorpolen explains the basis 
for Geopolitics in Nazi Germany and its influence in German 
diplomacy during the period. 
The Dissentient Judgement by Radhabinod Pal on the 
verdicts of the International Tribunal for the Far East is a 
fine presentation of legalistic rebuttal to the war crimes 
trials. Pal uses the record of the proceedings as evidence 
for his case against the sentences of guilt with the legal 
and moral reasons for his dissent. It is a critical scholarly 
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study. The Trial of the Germans by Eugene Davidson is a 
summary of the cases against the defendants at Nuremberg and 
evidence against these persons. All of the major conspirators 
are covered but Davidson takes little issue with the verdicts 
and supports the final judgements. 
The large number of secondary sources available on 
Japan in the period under study represents some important 
background material for the thesis. David James' The Rise and 
Fall of the Japanese Empire is a fine source for an analysis 
and chronicle of the events in Japan from 1951 to 1945» as is 
Japan's Few Order in East Asia by P.O. Jones. Quigley's 
The Par Eastern War is a detailed study of the Japanese war 
with China and the events to Pearl Harbor, Herbert Peis 
covers political and diplomatic policies of the Japanese 
government to the beginning of the war with the United States 
in his excellent book, The Road to Pearl Harbor. Maxon's 
Control of Japanese Foreign Policy is a detailed analysis of 
internal Japanese politics and its influence on foreign 
diplomacy. Japan's Decision to Surrender by Robert Butow 
deals vfith material more pertinent to the period 1944-1945 
but is also a reflection on past events. 
The two books, one by Masuo Kato, The Lost War, and the 
and the other by Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, are 
firsthand accounts by Japanese on the country's reactions to 
the political and diplomatic policies of the Japanese government, 
Ike's Japan's Decision for War is a record of the policy 
conferences of the Japanese government in 1941 and the steps 
toward Pearl Harbor. 
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A great deal has been written about the Third Reich 
since the end of the war but relatively few sources are 
available on Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan. Two 
books dealing with German diplomacy are Craig and Gilbert's 
The Diplomats and Seabury's The Wilhelmstrasse. The Diplomats 
is an expanded study of German diplomacy after the first 
World War and the technical aspects of the profession. 
The Wilhelmstrasse is a more closely concerned study of 
diplomacy in Nazi Germany and the key figures of the German 
Foreign Office in the period. 
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer 
is the most comprehensive examination of the Third Reich 
and has a few comments on Hitler's policy with Japan. 
F.H. Kinsley's Hitler's Strategy is an excellent summation of 
Hitler's strategic considerations for his subsequent actions 
in world diplomacy. The German Strategy of World Conquest 
by Whittlesey is an exaggerated product of the war and is 
of little value. 
